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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)l in 1980 to provide for 
prompt responses to releases of hazardous substances and to compel 
the cleanup of uncontrolled hazardous waste disposal sites. 2 The law 
established a statutory mechanism for managing and financing gov-
ernment and private responses to actual and threatened hazardous 
substance releases into the environment. 3 It created the well-known 
"Superfund"4 to pay for cleanup measures when the government 
cannot locate the "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) that gen-
erated, transported, or improperly disposed of hazardous wastes at 
a site, or owned the site.5 One of CERCLA's basic aims, however, 
was to ensure that PRPs would bear the cost of remedying the toxic 
1 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
2 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20. 
3 [d. pt. 1, at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125. 
4 See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
s See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988). 
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dangers that they caused.6 As a result, CERCLA requires that, 
when the government does locate a PRP, it give that person a limited 
choice: undertake and pay for the cleanup of its wastes itself, or fund 
a government-managed cleanup of the wastes. 7 
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by passing the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 8 SARA is an at-
tempt to overhaul CERCLA while preserving the features that made 
CERCLA effective. It retains CERCLA's basic structure and goals, 
but makes several major changes in the original law. In particular, 
SARA explicitly provides for contribution among PRPS.9 Contribu-
tion is an equitable remedy that spreads the burden of satisfying a 
plaintiff's judgment among defendants.1O It allows a defendant that 
has paid more than its fair share to the plaintiff to seek reimburse-
ment from those defendants paying less than their fair share. 11 
CERCLA did not address the issue of whether PRPs could sue 
one another for contribution, and until 1986, courts differed on 
whether such a right was implicit in the statute's language12 or in 
federal common law. 13 With the enactment of SARA, section 
9613(f)(1) now clarifies that PRPs may bring contribution actions 
against one another. 14 
Section 9613(f)(2), however, imposes a significant limitation on 
PRPs' ability to sue each other for contribution. 15 It enables the 
government to provide protection against non settling PRPs' actions 
for contribution-"contribution protection"-to those PRPs that 
reach an administrative or judicially approved settlement with the 
government. 16 According to the plain language of section 9613(f)(2), 
after PRPs that have settled with the government have received 
contribution protection, a court must reduce the nonsettling PRPs' 
potential liability to the government by the "amount of the settle-
ment."17 
6 See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). 
7 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607(a) (1988). 
8 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988». 
9 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 
10 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 336-
41 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. 
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(2) (1979). 
12 See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. 
IS See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. 
14 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 
16 See id. § 9613(f)(2). 
16 [d. 
17 [d. 
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The majority of courts reaching this issue have held that section 
9613(f)(2) reduces nonsettlor liability only by the amount of the 
settlement, no matter what that amount is. 18 One court, however, 
simultaneously enforced the "plain language" of section 9613(f)(2) 
and required that the government reduce its claim against the non-
settlors by the total amount of the settlors' proportionate shares of 
liability.19 This court, in United States v. Laskin,20 used a compara-
tive fault approach to apportion liability and determine the effect of 
a settlement on nonsettling PRPS.21 It reduced the nonsettlors' po-
tential liability by the settlors' "fair share" of the cleanup costs at 
the site, and not by an arbitrary settlement figure. 22 At least two 
other courts have adopted this minority approach and applied the 
comparative fault doctrine in private cost recovery cases, to grant 
contribution protection to PRPs that settled with other PRPS.23 
This Comment proposes that courts adopt the minority, Laskin 
approach to contribution protection in CERCLA actions between 
the government and non-settling PRPs. The Laskin approach would 
require courts to apply the principles underlying the settlement 
provisions of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA)24 to mit-
igate the now typically harsh effects of contribution protection on 
nonsettling PRPs. Allocating liability at hazardous waste sites using 
such a "fair share"-based method would further CERCLA and SAR-
A's goals of expediting cleanups, promoting voluntary settlements, 
and avoiding excessive litigation. 25 
Section II of this Comment provides an initial overview of CER-
CLA and SARA. It briefly discusses the laws' enforcement mecha-
nisms and liability standards, and the evolution of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) settlement policy under 
the two laws. Section III examines contribution, both in general and 
within the specific context of CERCLA and SARA, and explores 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 91 (lst Cir. 1990); Allied 
Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626, 638--39 (D. N.J. 1990); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 
721 F. Supp. 666, 679 (D. N.J. 1989); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. 
Supp. 1019, 1027 (D. Mass. 1989). 
19 United States v. Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989 WL 140230, at *4, *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 
27, 1989). 
20 Id. 
21 See infra notes 326-44 and accompanying text. 
22 Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989 WL 140230, at *7. 
23 See Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Management, 690 F. Supp. 1409, 1420 (E.D. Pa. 
1988); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., No. 85 C 1142, 1987 WL 27368, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1987). 
24 §§ 1-10, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1990). 
25 See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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courts' differing approaches to allocating liability among PRPs in 
contribution actions. Section IV of this Comment explores the con-
cept of contribution protection as it has developed under CERCLA, 
and compares the majority and minority approaches to reducing 
nonsettlors' potential liability to the government and to settling 
PRPs under section 9613(f)(2). Section IV also examines existing 
standards for determining whether a settlement is fair and reason-
able and thus a proper basis for providing settling parties with 
contribution protection. Section V concludes that using the minority, 
comparative fault approach-rather than the majority, "amount of 
the settlement" approach-to apportioning liability and determining 
the impact of settlement on nonsettling PRPs would improve the 
Superfund settlement process. It explores options for putting the 
comparative fault approach into practice and recommends several 
modifications of the approach to make it more manageable. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA AND SARA 
A. CERCLA: The Original Superfund Law 
In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA as a "last minute 
compromise"26 after almost two years of wrangling over various bills 
from the United States Senate and House of Representatives.27 
Although many courts have criticized CERCLA's legislative history 
26 United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
27 See generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). The Senate 
drafted CERCLA by combining provisions from House Bill 7020 and Senate Bill 1480. See 
126 CONGo REC. 7,490 (1980), reprinted in 3 ENVTL. L. INST., SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY 163 (1982); 125 CONGo REC. 17,988 (1979), reprinted in 2 ENVTL. L. INST., supra, 
at 561; see also Kristian E. Anderson, Note, The Right to Contribution for Response Costs 
Under CERCLA, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 347-49 (1985); Barbara J. Gulino, Note, A 
Right of Contribution Under CERCLA: The Case for Federal Common Law, 71 CORNELL 
L. REV. 668, 672-73 (1986). For a compilation of the legislative history of the earlier bills, 
see supra ENVTL. L. INST. 
Commentators generally have agreed that the members of Congress who supported versions 
of CERCLA more comprehensive than the compromise bill nonetheless supported the com-
promise because it presented an opportunity, before President-elect Ronald Reagan entered 
office, to enact some federal legislation regarding the cleanup of uncontrolled hazardous waste 
sites. See, e.g., Richard C. Belthoff, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107 of 
CERCLA, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 143 (1986); Ellen J. Garber, Federal Common Law 
of Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365, 366 (1987); 
Grad, supra, at 34. 
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as ambiguous and incomplete,28 it is nonetheless clear that the stat-
ute has the following objectives: to promote the greatest possible 
care in the handling of hazardous substances and hazardous wastes; 
to provide for rapid and effective responses to environmental emer-
gencies involving hazardous substances and hazardous wastes; to 
encourage PRPs to clean up uncontrolled hazardous waste sites and 
abate hazardous substance releases and threatened releases volun-
tarily; and to ensure that the parties responsible for releases of 
hazardous substances pay the necessary response costs and natural 
resource damages.29 
Congress enacted CERCLA after recognizing that the states were 
unable to respond adequately to the distinctly national problem of 
preventing and mitigating hazardous substance releases. 3o CERCLA 
proponents successfully argued that a uniformly administrated fed-
eral program that imposed a single liability standard would be more 
effective than a patchwork of unequally stringent state laws. 31 Con-
gress already had enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) of 1976, which established a "cradle-to-grave" system 
for tracking hazardous wastes from their generation, through their 
transport, storage, and treatment, and to their disposal at permitted 
facilities. 32 RCRA, however, did not give the EPA authority, fund-
ing, or personnel sufficient to address the issue of cleaning up aban-
doned hazardous waste sites. 33 
28 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989); Smith Land & 
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988), eert. denied, 488 U.S. 
1029 (1989); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902, 905 (D.N.H. 1985). 
Before SARA clarified various provisions of CERCLA, many courts reviewed CERCLA's 
legislative history in an effort to comprehend the statute. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty 
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039-42 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. 
Supp. 802, 805-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
29 See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 
1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 
1081 (1st Cir. 1986). 
The original Senate version of CERCLA also contained provisions regarding the compen-
sation of individuals exposed to hazardous substances. The bill's proponents deleted these 
provisions so that the bill would pass in the Senate. See Grad, supra note 27, at 19-22. 
30 See Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808. 
31 See id. at 809. 
32 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976). The 1976 Act was a complete revision of the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997. Congress amended the 
1976 Act by enacting first the Solid Waste Disposal Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
482, 94 Stat. 2334, and then the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221. RCRA currently is codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6987 (1988). 
33 See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 
836 n.lO, 838-39 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aiI'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), 
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CERCLA created the Hazardous Substance Response Trust 
Fund, a $1.6-billion fund with a life span of five years, to cover the 
costs of government responses at hazardous waste sites. 34 Congress 
was concerned that the cost of cleaning up the hundreds of sites 
across the United States would exhaust the limited monies of the 
fund,35 known as the "Superfund. "36 Legislators sought to preserve 
the Superfund's "precious resources"37 by requiring liable parties to 
reimburse the fund for the government's cleanup expenditures, and 
by encouraging the parties to undertake and pay for cleanups that 
the fund otherwise would finance. 38 Congress apparently intended 
that CERCLA's implicit goal of forcing PRPs to internalize the costs 
of haphazard waste disposal would be an effective means both of 
penalizing PRPs and of deterring such harmful behavior in the fu-
ture. 
B. SARA: The Superfund Law Amended 
During the first five years of the Superfund program, the govern-
ment and PRPs completed long-term remedial measures at only ten 
sites across the entire United States.39 Dismayed by the slow pace 
of these cleanups, Congress amended CERCLA by enacting SARA 
in October 1986.40 The new law extended the life of the Superfund 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 
1252 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982) (provision establishing Superfund); id. § 9611 (1988) (repealing 
42 U.S.C. § 9631) (current provision regarding uses of Superfund). An excise tax on forty· 
two hazardous feedstock chemicals, as well as on crude oil and imported petroleum products, 
was the source of about 86% of the original Superfund. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4612, 4661, 
4662, 4671 (1982) (Superfund revenue provisions amending Internal Revenue Code of 1954). 
The remainder of the original Superfund monies came from general revenues. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9631(b)(2) (1982). 
In October 1990, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. See 
generally Pub. L. No. 101·508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). The Act extended the excise tax 
supporting the Superfund through December 31, 1995, or until more than $11.97 billion is 
credited to the Fund, whichever occurs first. 136 CONGo REC. H12,553 (daily ed. October 26, 
1990). In addition, the Act authorized the EPA to appropriate a total of about $5.1 billion in 
Superfund monies through fiscal year 1994. [d. at H12,516. 
35 See Kelley V. Thomas Solvent Co., 717 F. Supp. 507, 518 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (1988). 
37 Kelley, 717 F. Supp. at 518. 
38 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9622 (1988); see, e.g., Kelley, 717 F. Supp. at 518; United 
States V. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983); see also Hazardous Waste Enforcement 
Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5035 (1985). 
39 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WASTE 
SITES: AN OVERVIEW OF SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES 28 (1985). 
40 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The floor debates leading to the Superfund 
program's reauthorization reflected Congress's awareness that CERCLA contained significant 
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program for an additional five years and increased its funding more 
than fivefold. 41 It authorized the EPA to continue to perform cleanup 
actions and recover its costs from liable parties, as well as compel 
PRPs to undertake cleanups.42 In addition, SARA established more 
stringent standards for cleanups and expanded the role of states and 
citizens in the cleanup process. 43 
C. Enforcing CERCLA and SARA 
1. The Enforcement Mechanisms 
The effective enforcement of CERCLA and SARA, to which this 
Comment will refer collectively as CERCLA, rests primarily upon 
two statutory mechanisms: the section 9607(a) cost recovery action 
and the section 9606 injunctive or administrative cleanup order. 44 
Section 960445 empowers the EPA to use the Superfund to respond 
to "releases"46 and threatened releases of "hazardous substances"47 
at contaminated "facilities. "48 The agency's response may take the 
form of a "removal action" or a "remedial action. "49 After drawing 
on the Superfund to finance one of these actions, the agency may 
seek to recover its expenses from the responsible parties under 
section 9607(a).50 
gaps, and that, as a result, the EPA had encountered problems during its six years of enforcing 
the law. See Garber, supra note 27, at 373; see generally Timothy B. Atkeson et aI., An 
Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,363 (1986) [hereinafter Annotated 
Legislative History]. 
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988); 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988); see also Annotated Legislative 
History, supra note 40, at 10,413-14. 
42 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606(a), 9607(a) (1988). 
43 See id. § 9621 (establishing cleanup standards); id. § 9672 (providing that CERCLA does 
not affect state tort or insurance law); id. § 9617 (requiring public notice and opportunity for 
public comment and hearing before adoption of any plan for remedial action). 
44 See id. §§ 9607(a), 9606(a). 
45 Id. § 9604. 
46 Id. § 9601(22). 
47 Id. § 9601(14) (incorporating by reference substances designated as hazardous under 
§ 112 of the Clean Air Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 and 40 C.F.R. § 61.01(a) (1990»; 
§ 307(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) and 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 
(1990»; CWA § 311(b)(2)(A) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) and 40 C.F.R. Table 116.4 
(1990»; RCRA § 3001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6921 and 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-261.33 (1990»; 
and § 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2606(f)). 
48 Id. § 9601(9). 
49 Id. § 9601(23) (defining "removal action"); id. § 9601(24) (defining "remedial action"). 
50 See id. § 9607(a). 
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Section 9606 enables the EPA to compel PRPs to undertake re-
sponse actions at sites where there is "an imminent and substantial 
endangerment" to human health and the environment. 51 It gives the 
EPA the authority to seek injunctive relief from the courts, as well 
as to issue its own orders requiring PRPs to perform and pay for 
cleanups. 52 Congress intended to encourage PRPs to assume the 
responsibility for conducting and funding cleanups themselves by 
providing the threat of an injunction or agency order. 53 The spectre 
of treble damages and fines of up to $25,000 per day for failure to 
obey these orders also further this goal. 54 
2. Liability Under CERCLA 
a. Strict Liability 
The backbone of CERCLA is the liability scheme established un-
der section 9607. 55 Although the statute preserves common law 
rights and remedies, 56 its concept of liability does not rest on the 
tort principles traditionally used in pollution cases: negligence, nuis-
ance, and trespass. 57 Congress intentionally left CERCLA silent 
regarding the standard of liability that courts were to impose. 58 
Nevertheless, every court to reach the issue has interpreted the 
51 See id. § 9606(a). 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. § 9607(c)(3); id. § 9606(b). 
55 See id. § 9607. 
56 See id. § 9614(a). 
57 Garber, supra note 27, at 367. 
56 See 126 CONGo REC. SI4,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980), reprinted in 2 ENVTL. L. INST., 
supra note 27, at 260 (Senate deleted strict and joint and several liability language from its 
CERCLA bill); 126 CONGo REC. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980), reprinted in 2 ENVTL. L. 
INST., supra note 27, at 168 (House deleted strict and joint and several liability language 
from its CERCLA bill); see also United States V. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp; 1249; 
1253-55 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States V. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806-08 (S.D. 
Ohio 1983). 
CERCLA § 9601(32) does state, however, that, when the statute uses the terms "liable" 
and "liability," they "shall be construed to be the standard of liability that obtains under 
section 1321 of Title 33," which is § 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988). Several courts have held that FWPCA § 311, which allows parties 
to recover their costs for responding to spills into navigable waters, imposes a strict liability 
standard. E.g., Steuart Transportation CO. V. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th 
Cir. 1979). 
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statute as mandating the application of a standard of strict liability. 59 
CERCLA's legislative history indicates that Congress wished to 
leave the exact definition of that standard to the courts rather than 
require them to enforce a potentially inflexible and inequitable rule. 60 
CERCLA holds four categories of persons strictly liable for certain 
costs associated with actual and threatened releases of hazardous 
substances. 61 These categories are owners or operators of facilities 
where a release or threatened release has occurred;62 past owners 
or operators of such facilities if they owned or operated the facilities 
at the time when hazardous substances were deposited at the facil-
ities;63 persons that arranged for the transport, treatment, or dis-
posal of hazardous substances-usually generators;64 and transport-
ers.65 
These four classes of PRPs can invoke only three limited defenses 
under section 9607(b): that the release or threatened release resulted 
from an act of God, from an act of war, or from the act of a third 
party not in any contractual relationship with the PRP.66 The third 
defense is only available if a PRP can prove that it exercised due 
care and took reasonable precautions against the foreseeable acts or 
omissions of any such third party. 67 
b. Joint and Several Liability 
Congress chose not to address the issue of apportioning liability 
under CERCLA.68 Despite this omission, courts generally have in-
59 E.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988), eert. denied, 490 
U.S. 1106 (1989); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (D.R.I. 1986); Philadelphia v. 
Stepan Chern. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
In enacting SARA, Congress reaffirmed its intention that courts impose a strict liability 
standard on PRPs under CERCLA. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 
74 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856. 
60 See Garber, supra note 27, at 368. Congress made no express reference to joint and 
several liability in the final bill for the same reason. See United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 
572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
62 See id. § 9607(a)(I). 
68 See id. § 9607(a)(2). 
64 See id. § 9607(a)(3). 
66 See id. § 9607(a)(4). 
66 See id. § 9607(b). 
67 See id. § 9607(b)(3). In 1986, Congress amended the definition of "contractual relation-
ship," as § 9607(b)(3) employs the phrase, in order to clarify that innocent buyers of contam-
inated property may invoke the "third-party" defense even if they participated in a property 
transaction with the previous owner that was responsible for the release. See id. § 9601(35). 
68 See supra note 58; see also Frank Prager, Apportioning Liability for Cleanup Costs 
Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 198, 211-12 (1986-1987). 
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terpreted the statute as inviting the application of a joint and several 
liability standard.69 In order to determine the propriety of applying 
this standard, these courts have performed case-by-case evalua-
tions. 70 Two approaches to imposing joint and several liability on 
PRPs at hazardous waste sites have developed: the majority, strict 
"Restatement" approach71 and the minority, "moderate" approach. 72 
1. The Restatement Approach 
According to the Restatement approach, CERCLA section 9607(a) 
defines the scope of a PRP's liability pursuant to a strict interpre-
tation of sections 433A,73 875,74 and 88175 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. 76 Under this interpretation, once a court has estab-
lished that a group of PRPs is liable under CERCLA, it may 
impose joint and several liability, rendering each PRP individually 
liable for the full amount of the cleanup costs; in the alternative, the 
court may hold each PRP liable only for that party's portion of the 
costs. 77 To determine which option to select, a court must undertake 
a factual inquiry into whether the harm at a site is divisible. 78 
Following Restatement section 875,79 courts will apply the joint 
and several liability standard when confronted with joint tortfeasors 
69 See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, American 
Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil, 110 S. Ct. 1115 (1990); United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 
171-72 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 
759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Steven B. Russo, Note, Contribution Under 
CERCLA: Judicial Treatment After SARA, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 267, 270-71 (1989); 
Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1524~3 
(1986) [hereinafter Note, Toxic Waste Litigation]. 
70 United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1312 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,808 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
71 See Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 810, 811 (first case to articulate Restatement 
approach to joint and several liability); see also Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-72; Kelley v. 
Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1552-53 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
72 United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256--57 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (first 
case to articulate moderate approach to joint and several liability). 
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1979). 
74 [d. § 875. 
75 [d. § 881. 
76 United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
77 See Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 810; United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 
1337~9 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also Carroll E. Dubuc & William D. Evans, Jr., Recent Devel-
opments Under CERCLA: Toward A More Equitable Distribution of Liability, 17 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,197, 10,197 (1987). 
78 See, e.g., United States v. Tyson, No. Civ. A. 84-2663, 1988 WL 7163, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 29, 1988) (and cases cited); Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 811. 
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979). 
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that have caused a single and indivisible harm.80 Conversely, as 
sections 433A 81 and 88182 of the Restatement suggest, a court may 
apportion liability among tortfeasors where two or more tortfeasors 
acting independently have combined to bring about a harm; in this 
circumstance, each joint tortfeasor is liable only for the part of the 
harm that it caused.83 Such an apportionment is appropriate when 
the court can either distinguish the causes from one another or find 
a reasonable basis for determining how much harm each cause con-
tributed to the total harm. 84 
Courts allocating liability under CERCLA are more likely to im-
pose joint and several liability on PRPs than to attempt to divide 
cleanup costs among all of them for two reasons. 85 It is very difficult 
to distinguish among the causes of the overall harm at hazardous 
waste sites.86 At the typical site, disparate amounts of various 
wastes, which differ in makeup and degrees of toxicity, have com-
mingled and begun to migrate. 87 Moreover, generator and trans-
porter records of the types and quantities of wastes sent to a site 
are often incomplete or missing altogether. 88 Most courts thus have 
rejected theories of apportionment based solely on volume of waste 
contributed as inappropriate. 89 
80 See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1312-13 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 810, 811. 
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1979). 
82 [d. § 881. 
83 See id. § 433A & cmt. on subsection (1), § 881; see, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 
F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988), een. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 
F. Supp. at 810, 811. 
84 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1979). The court in Chem-Dyne Corp. 
concluded that, pursuant to § 433B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the burden of proof 
as to apportionment should be upon each PRP. 572 F. Supp. at 810, 811. For further discussion 
of the strict Restatement approach, see Dubuc & Evans, supra note 77, at 10,198; Note, 
Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 69, at 1524-'33. 
86 See supra note 78; see also Gulino, supra note 27, at 671, 674; Russo, supra note 69, at 
270. 
86 United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
87 E.g., id.; United States v. Tyson, No. Civ. A. 84-2663, 1988 WL 7163, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 29, 1988) (and cases cited); Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 811. 
88 See Kevin Gaynor, Prosecution of a Superfund Action, 20 Env't. Rep. (BNA), 756, 756 
(Sept. 1, 1989); see also United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869, 870 (D.N.J. 1990). 
89 See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 725 (D.R.I. 1988), afl'd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st 
Cir. 1989), cen. denied, American Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil, 110 S. Ct. 1115 (1990); United 
States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 653 F. Supp. 984, 994 (D.S.C. 1984), afl'd sub 
nom. United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cen. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 
(1989). 
In affirming the decision in South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit suggested that considering volume of waste as a factor in 
determining the divisibility of harm at a site would be possible only if defendants also offered 
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One commentator has suggested another reason that courts have 
tended to interpret CERCLA so that apportionment is the exception 
rather than the rule. 90 Such an approach facilitates cleanups by 
enabling the government to recover the entire cost of a cleanup from 
one PRP without suing all of the liable parties at a site. 91 According 
to this view, identifying and joining all the PRPs at a site and proving 
the contribution of each PRP to the harm would be a lengthy, ex-
pensive, and often impossible endeavor that would delay cleanups. 92 
2. The Moderate Approach 
The moderate approach attempts to avoid the often harsh results 
of the Restatement approach by encouraging equitable apportion-
ment of costs among PRPS.93 This approach rejects the straightfor-
ward imposition of joint and several liability as inappropriate in light 
of Congress's emphasis on fairness to PRPS.94 Its proponents rec-
ommend a case-by-case factual analysis, using a set of specific cri-
teria, to determine how to allocate costs fairly among PRPS.95 
The moderate approach borrows this set of criteria from a pro-
posed amendment to CERCLA that Congress discarded. 96 The 
amendment, known as the "Gore Amendment,"97 would have given 
courts the power to impose joint and several liability whenever a 
evidence "disclosing the relative toxicity, migratory potential, and synergistic capacity of the 
hazardous substances at the site .... " Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172 n.26. The Monsanto court 
concluded that, under the facts of the case, "volume could not establish the effective contri-
bution of each waste generator to the harm at the ... site." [d. at 172-73. 
90 See Garber, supra note 27, at 369. 
91 See id. 
92 See id.; see also Thomas C.L. Roberts, Allocation of Liability Under CERCLA: A 
"Carrot and Stick" Formula, 14 ECOLOGY L. Q. 601, 629 (1987). 
93 See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256--57 (S.D. Ill. 1984); 
United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 465-66 (W.D. Okla. 1987); see also Russo, supra 
note 53, at 270-73. 
94 See A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. at 1256. In A & F Materials Co., the court 
attempted to avoid any "rigid application of the Restatement." [d. It reasoned that, under 
the Restatement approach, 
[d. 
any defendant who could not prove its contribution would be jointly and severally 
liable. This result must be avoided because both Houses of Congress were concerned 
about the issue of fairness, and joint and several liability is extremely harsh and 
unfair if it is imposed on a defendant who contributed only a small amount of waste 
to a site. 
96 See id. 
96 See id. at 1256-57. 
97 H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 3071(3)(B)(i)-(vi) (1980), reprinted in 1 ENVTL. L. 
INST., supra note 27, at 213-14; see also Prager, supra note 68, at 213-15. 
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PRP could not prove the amount of its contribution to the harm at 
a site. 98 It also, however, would have allowed courts faced with such 
a PRP to apportion damages according to the following equitable 
factors: the PRP's ability to prove that its contribution was distin-
guishable from that of other PRPs; the amount of hazardous waste 
attributable to the PRP; the toxicity of that waste; the PRP's in-
volvement in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or 
disposal of the waste; the degree of care that the PRP exercised in 
those activities; and the extent to which the PRP cooperated with 
government officials in preventing further harm. 99 
D. Settlements Under CERCLA 
The history of Superfund settlements before SARA is murky at 
best and illustrates CERCLA's lack of coherent settlement provi-
sions. lOo CERCLA's liability scheme implicitly authorized the EPA 
to take a coercive "carrot and stick" approach to gaining the coop-
eration of PRPs. 101 It allowed the agency to threaten the imposition 
of joint and several liability in order to force PRPs to settle rather 
than litigate. 102 Despite this grant of broad enforcement power to 
the EPA, however, CERCLA failed to give the agency or PRPs any 
explicit guidelines for reaching settlement agreements. 103 As a re-
sult, the EPA proceeded on a case-by-case basis, and its ill-defined 
settlement policy caused much confusion, delay, and frustration. 104 
1. The 1985 Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy 
In early 1985, the EPA published for public comment the "Haz-
ardous Waste Enforcement Policy," which set forth general princi-
98 See A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. at 1256. 
99 See id.; see also infra note 200 and accompanying text. According to the court in A & F 
Materials Co., "the moderate approach promotes fairness because it does not indiscriminately 
impose joint and several liability." 578 F. Supp. at 1257. 
100 See Frank B. Cross, Settlement Under the 1986 Superfund Amendments, 66 OR. L. 
REV. 517, 518-36 (1988); James M. Strock, Settlement Policy Under the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 58 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 599, 601-03 (1988). 
101 See Strock, supra note 100, at 601. 
102 See id. 
103 See Cross, supra note 100, at 518. 
104 See Carol E. Dinkins, Shall We Fight or Will We Finish: Environmental Dispute 
Resolution in a Litigious Society, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,398, 10,400 (1984). 
According to Dinkins, during the early 1980s, "settlements were vague, inconsistent, or not 
widely publicized, thus giving the regulated community no guidance on how and when the 
government would settle cases." I d. 
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pIes for private party settlements under CERCLA.105 Designed as 
a guidance document for agency personnel, the Policy delineated the 
EPA's criteria for evaluating and responding to PRP settlement 
offers. 106 It also described the methods by which the EPA intended 
to encourage PRPs to enter voluntarily into settlement discussions 
with each other and the government. 107 
Underlying this settlement policy was the EPA's belief that many 
PRPs would choose to reach an agreement with the government that 
provided for the total or substantial cleanup of a site in exchange 
for receiving favorable settlement terms, such as releases from fu-
ture liability.108 Those PRPs that did not want to settle would have 
to litigate their share of the cleanup costs and risk ending up paying 
even more than they would have if they had settled. 109 In the view 
of one commentator, the Policy took an unduly rigid approach toward 
settling and nonsettling PRPs alike,l1O and encouraged litigation 
rather than settlement whenever it appeared that the EPA might 
be able to win more in court than through compromise. 111 
2. Settlements Under SARA: Section 9622 
When it enacted SARA in 1986, Congress implemented new sec-
tion 9622, which contains settlement provisions designed to expedite 
response actions, eliminate excessive litigation, promote voluntary 
cleanups, use Superfund monies more efficiently, and treat PRPs 
more fairly.112 Section 9622 empowers the EPA to enter into settle-
ment agreements with PRPs for the performance of cleanups and 
106 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5034, 5035~6 (1985); see also Cross, supra note 100, at 522-24, 529-
36; Strock, supra note 100, at 602-05. The Policy was never revised and promulgated as a 
final rule, but Congress drew on it heavily in drafting the bills that eventually became SARA. 
See Richard H. Mays, Settlements with SARA: A Comprehensive Review of Settlement 
Procedures Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst) 10,101, 10,101 (1987). 
106 See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5036~8, 5042-43 (1985). 
107 See id. at 5038-40, 5043-44. For example, the Policy required the EPA to send "notice 
letters" informing PRPs of the identities of the other PRPs at the site and providing them 
with information about the volume and nature of the wastes to facilitate settlement discussions. 
[d. at 5037, 5043. 
108 See id. at 5035; see also Michael Dore, Dealing with the Post-SARA Dynamics of PRP 
Settlements: Anyone for a Stay?, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,431, 10,431 (1987). 
109 See Dore, supra note 108, at 10,431. 
llO See Cross, supra note 100, at 529. 
111 See id.; Note, Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 69, at 1511. 
ll2 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988). 
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the payment of cleanup costs.113 It establishes a scheme that the 
EPA may use to negotiate with PRPS,114 as well as a mechanism 
that the agency may use to allocate liability among PRPS.115 
Moreover, section 9622 seeks to encourage settlements between 
PRPs and the government by incorporating various incentives into 
the Superfund enforcement process. 116 One of these settlement in-
centives, "mixed funding," clearly illustrates the goals of SARA's 
settlement policies.117 In a "mixed funding" settlement, the EPA 
agrees to pay a portion of the response costs at a site with Superfund 
monies rather than to collect 100% of these costs from the settling 
PRPS.118 The EPA then may recover its expenditures from the non-
settling PRPS.119 
The underlying premise of section 9622 is that the EPA's success-
ful promotion of settlements will lead to less litigation between the 
government and PRPs, allowing the EPA to spend less of its time 
and money on litigation. 120 In addition, the EPA's encouragement of 
settlements may not only lead to the prompt initiation of cleanup 
measures by PRPs, but also preserve the Superfund. 121 The enact-
ment of SARA indicates Congress's wholehearted intention that 
negotiation and settlement be the primary means of resolving Su-
perfund cases. 122 
113 See id. § 9622(a). 
114 See id. § 9622(e)(1)-(2). 
115 See id. § 9622(e)(3). 
116 See, e.g., id. § 9622(e)(2)(A) (moratoria on EPA enforcement and cleanup measures 
during settlement negotiations); id. § 9622(f)(1) (EPA may give "covenants not to sue" to 
certain settling PRPs); id. § 9622(g) (EPA may give release to "de minimis" settlor, which is 
PRP that has contributed amount of hazardous substances both minimal in comparison to total 
amount at site and not significantly more toxic than other hazardous substances at site). 
Commentators have questioned whether § 9622 has been as effective as Congress intended in 
providing incentives for negotiated settlements and voluntary cleanups. See generally William 
W. Balcke, Note, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 
VA. L. REV. 123 (1988); see also Roberts, supra note 92, at 602, 610-11; Strock, supra note 
100, at 629. 
117 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(I) (1988). 
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2840-41. 
121 See id.; Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 717 F. Supp. 507, 518-19 (w.n. Mich. 1989). 
122 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1988); see also Tom Bayko & Paul A. Shore, Stormy Weather 
on Superfund Front Forecast as "Hurricane SARA" Hits, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 24; 
Cross, supra note 100, at 541-42, 544. 
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III. CONTRIBUTION UNDER CERCLA AND SARA 
A. Contribution: An Overview 
The right of contribution enables a joint tortfeasor that has paid 
more than its fair share in resolving a tort claim to sue its co-joint 
tortfeasors to recover the amount it paid in excess. 123 A remedy that 
developed in equity,l24 contribution ensures that the burden of dis-
charging a common liability falls fairly on all of the liable parties, 
rather than just on those which a plaintiff chooses to hale into court 
or with which the plaintiff has decided to settle. l25 In other words, 
by allowing the joint tortfeasor that has paid the full amount of 
damages for a harm to recover from the other liable parties, contri-
bution softens the harsh effects of joint and several liability.126 Be-
cause of the longstanding prohibition against unjust enrichment, 127 
however, a joint tortfeasor suing for contribution may seek only the 
amount it paid in excess of its equitable share, and may not compel 
other liable parties to pay beyond their equitable shares of the 
common liability. In addition, no joint tortfeasor may bring a con-
tribution action if it intentionally caused the harm for which it is 
liable. 128 
Under CERCLA, an action for contribution usually arises in one 
of three situations:l29 the EPA has sued fewer than all the PRPs at 
a site under section 9606 or 9607(a), and those "named" parties seek 
contribution against the other, unnamed PRPs at the site;130 a PRP 
that has financed the cleanup at a site has brought a cost recovery 
action under section 9607(a)(4)(B) against fewer than all of the other 
123 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(2) (1979). 
124 Id. § 886A, cmt. c. 
125 See id. § 886A; BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 97 (2d ed. 1984). 
126 See Gulino, supra note 27, at 668. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. § 886A(3). 
129 See Garber, supra note 27, at 374; Russo, supra note 69, at 276. 
130 See Garber, supra note 27, at 374; Russo, supra note 69, at 276; see also United States 
v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 749 (W.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd sub nom. United 
States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), em. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1527 (1990). 
Under this scenario, a PRP may choose to sue for contribution at one of several junctures in 
a case. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, cmt. i (1979). The PRP may try to 
join its co-joint tortfeasors as third-party defendants after it has received notice of the suit 
against it by the government. See id. In the alternative, the PRP may bring a separate action 
for contribution either after it has completed a settlement agreement with the government or 
another PRP, or after a court has entered judgment against it. See id.; ef. Anderson, supra 
note 27, at 366-67 (to avoid delay in replenishing Superfund, courts should require PRPs to 
bring contribution claims separately, after trial on liability issues). 
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PRPs at the site, and those named parties bring actions for contri-
bution against the unnamed PRPs at the site, as well as counter-
claims for contribution against the PRP originally seeking to recover 
its costs;131 or a PRP brings an action to recover its response costs 
from another PRP at a site. 132 
Courts have held that a PRP's liability for contribution is sev-
eral,l33 not joint and several. l34 In other words, although each PRP 
that is a defendant in a cost recovery action is jointly and severally 
liable for the full cost of a cleanup, the third-party PRPs that the 
original defendant PRP sues for contribution are liable only for their 
"fair share" of the harm at the site. 135 
It is important to clarify that the issue of apportionment typically 
arises in two different stages of a government cost recovery action 
under CERCLA, the allocation stage and the contribution stage. 136 
In the first stage, a court must determine the allocation of liability 
among PRPs according to the principles of joint and several liabil-
ity.137 The apportionment issue surfaces again after the court has 
made this initial inquiry into the divisibility or indivisibility of the 
harm. l38 Once the court has found that the PRPs at the site are 
jointly and severally liable to the government, then any of these 
PRPs may try to limit the amount of damages it must pay by seeking 
contribution from its fellow PRPS.139 The court may use "equitable 
131 See Garber, supra note 27, at 374; Russo, supra note 69, at 276. 
132 See Garber, supra note 27, at 374; Russo, supra note 69, at 276; see also FMC Corp. v. 
Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285, 1287 (D. Minn. 1987), appeal dismissed, 871 F.2d 
1091 (8th Cir. 1988). This third situation does not represent a true action for contribution, but 
a court determining the outcome of that action must allocate liability in the same way that it 
would in deciding a "real" contribution action. Russo, supra note 69, at 276; cf. Laurie Burt 
& Robert S. Sanoff, Allocating Contribution Slwres in Superfund Cases, in MINIMIZING 
LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 17, 20 n.6 (1990) (controversy over whether 
private party cost recovery action under CERCLA is equivalent to contribution action). 
133 Under several liability, each tortfeasor pays no more than its allocated share, and the 
plaintiff absorbs the loss of any uncollected share. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (6th 
ed. 1990). 
134 See United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 176, 229 (W.D. Mo. 
1985). 
135 See id. A few commentators have suggested that contribution among PRPs be joint and 
several-not merely several-so that all of the PRPs at a site, whether the original complaint 
named them or not, would be responsible for the full amount of the response costs. See Russo, 
supra note 69, at 274; Note, Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 69, at 1539. 
136 See United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 938 (W.D. Wash. 1990); 
see also Garber, supra note 27, at 370-71. 
137 See Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. at 938; see also supra notes 68-99 and 
accompanying text. 
138 See Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. at 938. 
139 See id. 
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factors" to apportion damages in this stage. 140 According to several 
courts, a court's discretion in allocating damages among PRPs during 
the contribution stage does not affect the PRPs' joint and several 
liability. 141 
B. Contribution Under CERCLA: An Implied Right 
CERCLA provided no express right to contribution among PRPs. 
Congress had considered but rejected the idea of including a provi-
sion allowing contribution actions in the original law. 142 Many courts 
nonetheless found an implied right to contribution in CERCLA.I43 
Several courts found that the text of CERCLA inherently pro-
vided PRPs with a right to contribution. 144 Some of these courts held 
that the right arose from section 9607(a)(4)(b), 145 which enables PRPs 
to recover response costs from other PRPs at a site. 146 Other courts 
located an implied right to contribution in section 9607(e)(2), 147 which 
preserves any causes of action that a PRP has against other per-
sons.148 The United States Department of Justice affirmed this in-
140 See w. 
141 See id.; see also United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 413, 416 (D. N.J. 1991); 
United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.22 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 
(1989). 
142 See, e.g., 126 CONGo REC. S14,941 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980), reprinted in 2 ENVTL. L. 
INST., supra note 27, at 237; 126 CONGo REC. H9461-64 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980), reprinted 
in 2 ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 27, at 137-38; see also United States V. New Castle County, 
642 F. Supp. 1258, 1262-63 (D. Del. 1986); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 
1486-89 (D. Colo. 1985). 
143 See, e.g., New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1269; United States V. Conservation 
Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 228 (W.D. Mo. 1985); see generally Dale Guariglia, Note, 
Apportionment and Contribution under the "Superfund" Act, 53 UMKC L. REV. 594, 606-
14 (1985); Gulino, supra note 27, at 676-93. 
Only one court arguably held that there was no right to contribution under CERCLA. See 
United States V. Westinghouse Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,483,20,485 (S.D. 
Ind. 1983) (CERCLA preserves right to contribution under state law but does not establish 
similar right under federal common law). 
144 E.g., United States V. Miami Drum Services, Inc., 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20,539,20,541 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 1986); Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 228; United 
States V. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391,404 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
145 E.g., Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. at 404; Philadelphia V. Stepan Chern. Co., 
544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982). But see New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1263-
65 (no implied right to contribution under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)). 
146 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
147 E.g., Miami Drum Services, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,541; Wehner V. 
Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985). But see, e.g., New Castle 
County, 642 F. Supp. at 1265 (§ 9607(e)(2) merely preserves actions not authorized by CER-
CLA if common law provides right to such actions). 
148 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1988). 
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terpretation of section 9607(e)(2) when Congress debated the pas-
sage of CERCLA in 1980.149 
Still other courts held that Congress had authorized them to for-
mulate a federal common law of contribution under CERCLA.l50 
These courts held alternatively that the legislative history of CER-
CLA supported the judicial creation of a right to contribution for 
PRPS,151 or that the federal courts have the authority to create 
federal common law in order to protect significant federal interests, 
such as promoting settlements and guarding the Superfund from 
exhaustion. 152 
C. Contribution Under SARA: The Right Made Explicit 
Section 9613(f)(1) expressly allows parties found liable under 
CERCLA to bring actions for contribution against one another.l53 
In enacting section 9613(f)(1) in 1986, Congress clarified that it was 
confirming the right to contribution that already existed under CER-
CLA.l54 
149 126 CONGo REC. HIl,788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980), reprinted in 2 ENVTL. L. INST., supra 
note 27, at 169 (opinion requested from Office of Legislative Affairs, United States Department 
of Justice, by Rep. James Florio). 
150 See, e.g., New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1268-69; Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 
F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Colo. 1985). These courts cited a pair of opinions in which the United 
States Supreme Court held that a right to contribution may arise within the framework of a 
federal statute in two ways: through creation by Congress, whether expressly or by clear 
implication, or through the power of federal courts to create a federal common law of contri-
bution. See New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1262 (citing Texas Industries v. Radcliff 
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981) and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 
451 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1981»; ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. at 1486 (citing same cases). 
151 See, e.g., New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1266-67; ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 
at 1486-89. In reviewing CERCLA's legislative history, the court in New Castle County noted 
that Congress was in the process of considering amendments to CERCLA. 642 F. Supp. at 
1267-68. These amendments, which included an express right to contribution, became SARA. 
152 See New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1268-69. 
153 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988). Section 9613(0(1) provides that 
Id. 
[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially 
liable under section 9607(a), during or following any civil action under section 9606 
or under section 9607(a). Such claims . . . shall be governed by Federal law. In 
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable 
parties using such eqUitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing 
in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for 
contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 . . . or section 9607 
154 See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 79 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861; id. pt. 3, at 18, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3041. 
Although § 9613(0(1) mandates that courts use federal law in resolving actions for contri-
bution under CERCLA, it does not define "federal law." The legislative history of SARA 
supports the interpretation that courts should apply the federal common law that they were 
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The language of section 9613(0(1) suggests that a PRP may bring 
a contribution claim against any party that a court either has held 
liable under CERCLA or may hold liable in a pending CERCLA 
action. 155 There is disagreement, however, over whether the section 
allows a PRP to sue for contribution before a court has found that 
PRP liable under CERCLA.I56 One court has held that section 
9613(0(1) does not preclude a PRP from seeking a declaratory judg-
ment to establish that its fellow PRPs are liable to it for contribution 
in the event that the plaintiff PRP is later found liable. 157 According 
to another court, however, until the plaintiff PRP has resolved its 
liability to the government through judgment or settlement, any 
motion that it brings for declaratory judgment on a contribution 
claim is premature. 158 
D. Approaches to Apportioning Liability in Contribution Actions 
Under CERCLA 
Section 9613(0(1) does not suggest what "equitable factors" courts 
are to use in apportioning liability among PRPs in contribution ac-
tions. 159 As a result, commentators have weighed the benefits and 
disadvantages of four different approaches for allocating damages 
among joint tortfeasors: the pro rata, comparative fault, comparative 
causation, and Gore amendment approaches. 160 
1. The Pro Rata Approach 
The pro rata approach of apportioning liability is based upon the 
maxim "equality is equity."161 Commentators have noted that appor-
developing under CERCLA. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 80 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862; id. pt. 3, at 18-19, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3041-42; id. pt. 5, at 24, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3147. Moreover, 
commentators who, before the enactment of SARA, examined the idea of a federal common 
law of contribution under CERCLA determined that the courts should adopt a uniform federal 
rule of contribution. See Anderson, supra note 27, at 356-61; Guariglia, supra note 143, at 
608-09, 612-15; Gulino, supra note 27, at 679-93. 
155 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 
156 Compare Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
with United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 686 F. Supp. 696, 700 (S.D. Ind. 1988). 
157 Rockwell Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. at 1389; see also Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara 
Vest, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 713, 718 (W.D.N. Y. 1991). The court in Rockwell Int'l Corp. acknowl-
edged that the actual payment of damages in a contribution action may not occur until a 
plaintiff PRP is found liable. 702 F. Supp. at 1389. 
158 Seymour Recycling Corp., 686 F. Supp. at 700. The court in Rockwell Int'l Corp. 
specifically rejected the Seymour court's reasoning. 702 F. Supp. at 1389 n.4. 
159 See 42 U .S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 
160 See, e.g., Garber, supra note 27, at 382-87; Guariglia, supra note 143, at 615-22; Russo, 
supra note 69, at 276-78. 
161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, cmt. h (1979). 
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tionment under the pro rata approach would be simple to administer, 
because it would require the court in a CERCLA action merely to 
count the number of PRPs at a site and divide the total amount of 
response costs at the site by that number. 162 Commentators have 
suggested that the approach may be an inappropriate means of 
allocating liability in any type of CERCLA action. 163 They have noted 
that, by forcing a PRP to bear response costs equally regardless of 
its actual responsibility in creating the harm, a court adopting the 
pro rata approach may ignore Congress's concern that courts appor-
tion liability fairly.l64 No court appears to have adopted the pro rata 
approach in a CERCLA case. 
2. The Comparative Fault Approach 
Several courts have applied the comparative fault approach to 
resolve CERCLA contribution actions. l65 The approach requires a 
court to distribute liability among PRPs according to each PRP's 
relative degree of fault in causing the harm at a site. 166 One com-
mentator has noted that the concept of comparative fault seems 
innately applicable in Superfund cases, perhaps because it corre-
sponds most closely to popular ideas about fairness. 167 
The 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCF A)l68 embodies the 
comparative fault approach, which also is known as the "relative 
162 See, e.g., Garber, supra note 27, at 383. 
The 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) adopted the pro rata 
approach to allocating liability in an action for contribution. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG 
TORTFEASORS ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 87 (1975). 
163 See Garber, supra note 27, at 382-83; Russo, supra note 69, at 276. 
164 Garber, supra note 27, at 382-83; Russo, supra note 69, at 276. 
165 See, e.g., Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Ensco, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 384, 388 (C.D. 
Ill. 1991); United States v. Western Processing Co., 756 F. Supp. 1424, 1430-32 (W.D. Wash. 
1990) (and cases cited); United States v. Tyson, C.A. No. 84-2663, 1990 Haz. Waste Lit. Rep. 
18,708 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1990); Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Management, 690 F. Supp. 
1409, 1417-18 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
166 See, e.g., Western Processing Co., 756 F. Supp. at 1430; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 886A, cmt. h (1979). 
167 See Garber, supra note 27, at 383. 
The comparative fault approach may pose some difficulty for the courts because, in order 
to ascertain as accurately as possible the percentage of fault ascribable to each PRP, a court 
must rely on factual information that, though abundant, is usually of limited usefulness and 
great complexity. In addition, as one commentator has noted, a PRP's degree of fault may 
have little relationship to the harm actually caused. See Roberts, supra note 92, at 627. For 
example, a generator may have exercised extreme care in packaging its wastes and hiring a 
reputable transporter; however, due to negligence on the part of the disposal facility operator, 
the generator's wastes still may escape and contaminate a major groundwater aquifer. 
168 UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §§ 1-10, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1990). 
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culpability"169 or "comparative contribution"170 approach. UCF A de-
fines the term "fault" to include not only negligent or reckless con-
duct, but also any acts or omissions that subject a party to strict 
liability.l71 Courts therefore have been able to use U CF A, or at least 
its underlying principles, in CERCLA contribution actions172 despite 
the strict liability standard commonly read into section 9607. 173 
The courts that have taken the comparative fault approach in 
CERCLA cases have not followed UCF A word for word; instead, 
they have adopted the Act's basic aim, the equitable apportionment 
of liability, and brought it to bear only in the contribution stage of 
the case. 174 A strict application of UCF A in a CERCLA case would 
require a court initially to determine the percentage of the total fault 
of all the parties to a government cost recovery action for which 
each plaintiff, defendant, and third-party defendant, as well as each 
settling party, is liable. 175 The court would assign each PRP a share 
of the combined fault of all the parties to the cost recovery action, 
basing the allocation on the PRP's individual conduct and the causal 
connection between that conduct and the harm to the site. 176 In 
comparing the fault attributable to each PRP, the court would con-
sider various factors, including the extent to which a PRP knew that 
it was engaging in a potentially dangerous activity, the magnitude 
of the risk that a PRP knew or should have known it was creating, 
and the particular circumstances of a PRP's activity.177 
169 See Burt & Sanoff, supra note 132, at 20. These authors propose that courts taking the 
"relative culpability" approach ask whether a given PRP is liable for intentional wrongdoing, 
negligence, or conduct without fault; what standard of care applies to that PRP; how foresee-
able the creation of the harm at the site was; and what steps the PRP took or should have 
taken to avoid or mitigate the harm. Id. at 23-25. 
170 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, cmt. h (1979). 
171 UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 41. According to the comment 
following § I, "[sltrict liability for both abnormally dangerous activities and for products bears 
a strong similarity to negligence as a matter of law (negligence per se), and the factfinder 
should have no real difficulty in setting percentages of fault." Id. § I, cmt. 
172 See supra note 165. But see United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 
1049 n.29 (D. Mass. 1989) (finding application of UCFA to CERCLA cases "highly inappro-
priate" because CERCLA has strict liability standard), a/I'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). 
173 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); see supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra note 165. 
175 See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. 45. UCFA § 2 limits courts 
to considering only the liability of the actual parties to the litigation. See id. § 2. Limiting the 
apportionment of liability to those who are parties to the action places the burden of joining 
additional PRPs as third-party defendants on the defendants, who likely would try to reduce 
their damages by spreading liability among as many of the PRPs at the site as possible. See 
id. § 2, cmt. 
176 See id. § 2(b). 
177 See id. § 2, cmt., 12 U.L.A. 46. 
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UCF A would require that the court, after it had completed this 
initial apportionment of liability according to relative fault, nonethe-
less enter a judgment against the liable parties on the basis of joint 
and several liability, which applies under the Act. 178 Thus, a court 
strictly applying UCF A would not award damages on the basis of 
its findings with regard to PRPs' varying degrees of liability, but 
rather would allow the government to recover the full amount of its 
claim from any or all of the PRPs against which it had proven its 
case. 179 The court's findings on the PRPs' relative liability then would 
dictate the size of the claims that the PRPs could bring against one 
another for contribution. 180 In effect, in apportioning liability accord-
ing to UCFA's specific terms, the court would determine the ultimate 
amount for which each PRP would be fairly responsible after the 
court resolved any contribution actions. 181 
In reality, courts using the comparative fault approach in CER-
CLA cases have not first allocated PRP fault according to propor-
tional share of the harm, then imposed joint and several liability, 
and then allowed contribution actions based on the court's initial 
allocation of fault. These courts instead have imposed joint and 
several liability first and then attempted to ascertain PRPs' relative 
degrees of fault afterwards. They have not applied UCF A's specific 
terms, but rather merely have borrowed its underlying tenet of 
assigning liability according to relative fault. 
Another difference between the plain language of UCF A and the 
comparative fault approach that courts actually have used in CER-
CLA cases concerns the status of absent or insolvent parties to a 
CERCLA action. When part or all of a PRP's share is not collectible, 
because the PRP is absent or insolvent, UCFA would require that 
a court redistribute the uncollectible amount among the other liable 
parties according to their respective percentages of fault. 182 These 
parties then would have to pay sums reflecting their proportionate 
shares of the now-divided uncollected amount to the plaintiff. 183 The 
178 See id. § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 45. 
179 See id. § 2, cmt., 12 U.L.A. 46. In other words, under the UCFA approach, the court 
would not compel each PRP to pay an amount equal to the PRP's relative percentage of the 
total liability directly to the plaintiff. See id. 
180 See id. § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 45; see also id. § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 49 (basis for contribution is 
each party's equitable share of liability as determined in accordance with UCFA § 2). Sections 
4 and 5 of UCFA, respectively, provide a right to contribution and address the enforcement 
of contribution. See id. §§ 4, 5, 12 U.L.A. 49-53. 
181 See id. § 2, cmt., 12 U.L.A. 46. 
182 See id. § 2(d). 
183 See id. 
1991] CERCLA NONSETTLOR LIABILITY 97 
court would be able to reallocate the uncollectible loss only upon a 
motion made within one year of the entry of judgment. 184 The party 
whose liability was reallocated would remain both subject to contri-
bution and liable to the plaintiff for its portion of the judgment. 185 
The UCF A approach thus would ensure that the burden of an insol-
vent party fell fairly upon all the parties to the action, rather than 
compelling the plaintiff to absorb the entire loss. 186 
Courts in CERCLA cases, on the other hand, typically have forced 
nonsettling PRPs at a site to make up any differences among the 
settling PRPs' payment to the government, the full amount of dam-
ages at the site, and the amount of damages for which absent or 
insolvent PRPs are responsible. 187 
3. The Comparative Causation Approach 
Another means of apportioning liability among PRPs, the com-
parative causation approach, involves dividing response costs ac-
cording to the amount of hazardous substances that each PRP has 
contributed to a site. l88 Using this approach, a court considers the 
volume and characteristics of every substance that each PRP has 
disposed of at the site. 189 Proponents argue that the comparative 
causation method is more equitable than other methods, because it 
is more consistent with section 9607(a), which premises PRP liability 
on causation rather than number of PRPs or negligence. l90 Many 
courts have held, however, that the comparative causation method 
is inappropriate given the extreme difficulty of individually deter-
mining each cause of the overall harm at a site. 191 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
186 See id.; see also David K. DeWolf, Several Liability and the Effect of Claim Reduction: 
Further Thoughts, 23 GoNZ. L. REV. 37, 41-42 (1987-1988). 
187 See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text. 
188 Garber, supra note 27, at 384-85; Guariglia, supra note 143, at 619-21; see also United 
States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1044 (D. Mass. 1989) (finding that it is 
"not unreasonable" to base liability allocation among de minimis parties on each party's "share 
of the total amount of the waste at a site"), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (lst Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985), modified, No. 80-225-L, 24 Env't 
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1152 (D.N.H. Mar. 3, 1986). 
189 See Guariglia, supra note 143, at 620. These characteristics can include the substance's 
toxicity, persistence, migratory potential, ignitability, and reactivity. [d. 
190 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 92, at 627-28 & nn.159-62; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) 
(1988). 
191 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. In addition, one commentator has con-
cluded that courts can only use the comparative causation method when all the PRPs are 
generators. See Guariglia, supra note 143, at 621. 
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Section 9622(e)(3), which was enacted as part of SARA in 1986, 
embodies a modified comparative causation approach for dividing 
liability among PRPS.192 With a general aim of expediting settle-
ments, section 9622(e)(3) allows the EPA to prepare "nonbinding 
allocations of liability" (NBARs), which assign PRPs rough percent-
ages of the total liability at a site that is subject to SARA settlement 
procedures. 193 An interim EPA guidance document implementing the 
section instructs the EPA to use the volume of waste that each PRP 
has contributed to a site as the threshold criterion for measuring 
liability when it prepares a NBAR. 194 
To prepare an NBAR, the EPA first must divide 100% of the 
liability at a site among the waste generator PRPs there according 
to volume. 195 The agency then may adjust these allocations using the 
following criteria: the strength of the evidence linking wastes at the 
site to specific PRPs; the ability of these PRPs to pay; the risks of 
litigation; public interest considerations; the precedential value of 
the case if it were to proceed to court; the value of getting a fixed 
monetary settlement; inequities and aggravating factors; and the 
nature of the case that will remain after settlement. l96 Finally, the 
agency must assign shares of liability to the nongenerator PRPs: 
site owners and operators primarily according to degree of culpabil-
ity, and transporters according to volume, packaging, and placement 
of the wastes at the site. 197 Section 9622(e)(3) limits the EPA's use 
of NBARs, however, to those sites where the agency believes that 
the device might encourage settlement and remedial action. 198 More-
over, once completed, an NBAR does not bind the government, 
which may reject PRP settlement offers based on an NBAR. 199 
192 See 42 u.s.c. § 9622(e)(3) (1988). 
193 See id. (EPA may, at its own discretion, use NBAR to "allocate[] percentages of the 
total costs of response among potentially responsible parties at [aJ facility" after completion 
of remedial investigation and feasibility study). 
194 See Interim Guidelines for Preparing Nonbinding Allocations of Responsibility, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 19,919, 19,920 (1987). 
195 See id. at 19,921. The agency also may consider the toxicity and mobility of the hazardous 
substances which each PRP has contributed to the site. See id. at 19,920-21. 
196 See id. at 19,920; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(A) (1988). The EPA originally included 
these criteria in the 1985 Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy. See Hazardous Waste En-
forcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5037-38 (1985). 
197 52 Fed. Reg. at 19,921-22. 
198 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(A) (1988). 
199 [d. § 9622(e)(3)(E). In addition, an NBAR is not admissible in court as evidence, and 
courts do not have the jurisdiction to review NBARs. See id. § 9622(e)(3)(C). 
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4. The Gore Amendment Approach 
Several courts have held that the equitable factors they must 
consider under section 9613(f)(1) may include the six Gore Amend-
ment criteria:2°O a PRP's ability to demonstrate that its contribution 
to the harm at a site can be distinguished from that of other PRPs; 
the amount of hazardous waste attributable to the PRP; the toxicity 
of that waste; the PRP's involvement in the generation, transpor-
tation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the waste; the degree of 
care that the PRP exercised with respect to the waste; and the 
extent to which the PRP cooperated with government officials in 
preventing further harm. 201 According to one commentator, the Gore 
Amendment approach combines the comparative causation method's 
volume and toxicity-based standards with the comparative fault 
method's evaluation of the negligence of each PRP and the harm it 
has created. 202 Other commentators have noted, however, that the 
ambiguity of the amendment's six criteria makes application of the 
Gore Amendment approach unwieldy. 203 
5. Other Approaches to Apportioning Liability 
Another set of equitable factors that some courts have considered 
in allocating liability in CERCLA contribution actions focuses on 
whether certain PRPs, namely current owners of hazardous waste 
sites, will be unjustly enriched when their sites are cleaned up. 204 
These factors include the circumstances of a PRP's purchase of the 
property on which the site is located, the current value of that 
property, and the projected value of the property after the comple-
tion of the cleanup.205 Courts apply these factors to ensure that one 
PRP will not receive a benefit to the financial detriment of another 
PRP.206 In addition, some courts have taken into account PRPs' use, 
200 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
201 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 938 (W.D. Wash. 1990); United States 
v. Tyson, C.A. No. 84-2663, 1990 Haz. Waste Lit. Rep. 18,708 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 26, 1990); 
Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp. 78, 86 (D. Me. 1988), aiI'd, Travelers Indem. Co. 
v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629 (lst Cir. 1989). 
202 See Garber, supra note 27, at 386. 
203 See, e.g., Dubuc & Evans, supra note 77, at 10,200; Prager, supra note 68, at 222. 
204 See Burt & Sanoff, supra note 132, at 21, 26; see, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement 
Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989); 
Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, 696 F. Supp. 994, 1003 (D.N.J. 1988). 
205 See Burt & Sanoff, supra note 132, at 26. 
206 See id. at 21. 
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permitted by CERCLA section 9607(e)(2), of indemnification, hold 
harmless, and similar agreements207 to attempt to shift the burden 
of liability under CERCLA among themselves. 208 
IV. CONTRIBUTION PROTECTION UNDER CERCLA AND SARA 
A. Contribution Protection and Nonsettlor Liability Under 
CERCLA: Pre-SARA 
Because CERCLA did not provide expressly for contribution 
among PRPs, it did not address the issue of whether PRPs that 
resolve their liability to the government may receive protection 
against contribution actions brought by nonsettling PRPs. Nonethe-
less, prior to the enactment of SARA in 1986, the EPA often engaged 
in lengthy negotiations with PRPs that wanted clauses granting 
them "contribution protection" included in their settlements. 209 
1. EPA's 1985 Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy: The UCATA 
Approach 
Before settling PRPs agreed to pay the government a portion of 
the response costs at a site, they typically sought to ensure that 
they would not have to pay a second time, to nonsettling PRPs that 
the government subsequently would sue to recoup its remaining 
costS.210 These settlors wanted the government to agree to reduce 
the amount that it would seek from the nonsettlors to the extent 
necessary to extinguish the settlors' potential liability for contribu-
tion to the nonsettlors.211 
207 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(I) (1988) (allowing PRPs to use such agreements to shift liability 
among themselves). 
208 See, e.g., Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1456-57 (N.D. 
Ind. 1990); Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1458 (N.D. Cal. 1989); see also Burt 
and Sanoff, supra note 132, at 21-22,26-27. But see CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 
759 F. Supp. 1269, 1281-83 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (and cases discussed). 
209 See Mays, supra note 105, at 10,109. 
210 See id. As the EPA's 1985 Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy pointed out, 
[w]hen the Agency reaches a partial settlement with some parties, it will frequently 
pursue an enforcement action against nonsettling responsible parties to recover the 
remaining costs of cleanup. If such an action is undertaken, there is a possibility that 
those nonsettlors would in turn sue settling parties. If this action by nonsettling 
parties is successful, then the settling parties would end up paying a larger share of 
cleanup costs than was determined in the Agency's settlement. This is obviously a 
disincentive to settlement. 
50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5038-39 (1985). 
211 See id. at 5039, 5043. 
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The government, on the other hand, usually hesitated in giving 
settling PRPs what would amount to complete releases from liabil-
ity.212 In the 1985 Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy,213 the EPA 
acknowledged that contribution protection for settlors was valuable 
as a means of providing finality to settlements.214 It asserted, how-
ever, that express contribution protection clauses were "generally 
not appropriate. "215 
The EPA had two reasons for restricting the use of contribution 
protection clauses. It did not want to have to absorb costs that it 
otherwise could force PRPs to pay.216 In addition, the agency rea-
soned that existing law, in the form of section 4 of the 1955 Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA),217 already protected 
those PRPs that entered into "good faith" settlements with the 
government from contribution actions by nonsettling PRPS.218 The 
EPA incorporated the UCATA approach into its 1985 settlement 
policy in order to enable the government to settle with some of the 
PRPs at a site and then pursue the nonsettling PRPs for the balance 
of the cleanup costs, even if that amount exceeded the nonsettlors' 
"fair share" of the cleanup costS. 219 
212 See id.; see also Mays, supra note 105, at 10,109; Strock, supra note 100, at 604. 
213 See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text. 
214 See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5039 (1985). 
215 Id. 
216 See id. at 5043. 
217 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975). UCATA § 4 reads: 
Id. 
When a release or covenant not to sue ... is given in good faith to one of two or 
more persons liable in tort for the same injury ... : 
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury 
... unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the 
extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of 
the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and 
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution 
to any other tortfeasor. 
218 Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5043 (1985). The EPA argued 
that the courts should adopt UCATA § 4 as "the federal rule of decision" under CERCLA. 
Id. 
219 See id. at 5043; see also Barry S. Neuman, No Way Out? The Plight of the Supe'/fund 
Nonsettlor, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,295, 10,296 (1990). 
The EPA did not import § 1 of UCATA into the Policy, noting that doing so would "preclude 
settlors from seeking contribution from non-settlors [sic] unless the settlors financed or per-
formed a 100 percent cleanup at the site." Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 5034, 5043 (1985). UCATA § 1 states that "a tortfeasor who enters into a settlement 
with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability 
for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement .... " UCATA § l(d), 
12 U.L.A. 63 (1975). 
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Under the EPA's interpretation of UCATA section 4, when the 
government settled in good faith with fewer than all of the PRPs at 
a site, it could hold each of the PRPs that had not settled, or that 
the settlement had not released from liability, jointly and severally 
liable for the remainder of the harm that the settlement was designed 
to remedy.220 Moreover, according to the agency, UCATA section 4 
barred these nonsettlors from suing the settlors for contribution. 221 
The government, however, had to reduce its claim against the non-
settlors by the amount that the settlors previously had agreed to 
pay to resolve their liability. 222 
2. United States v. Conservation Chemical Co.: The UCFA 
Approach 
At least one pre-SARA court rejected the EPA's concept of non-
settlor liability and, in so doing, implicitly questioned the agency's 
approach to contribution protection. In United States v. Conserva-
tion Chemical Co. ,223 the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Missouri held that a nonsettling PRP could be liable 
only for its proportionate share of the cleanup costs at a site, not for 
whatever amount the government sought to recover from it.224 The 
parties in Conservation Chemical had asked the court to review a 
preliminary agreement for the cleanup of the Conservation Chemical 
Company site in Missouri and to determine whether the settling 
PRPs could recover some of their costs in a contribution action 
against the non settling PRPS.225 
In responding to the nonsettling PRPs' objections to the proposed 
agreement, the Conservation Chemical court noted that CERCLA 
did not describe the effect that partial settlements-settlements 
between the government and fewer than all the PRPs at a site-
would have on claims and liabilities of nonsettling PRPS.226 The court 
examined three possible answers to the question of whether nonset-
tling tortfeasors may seek contribution from tortfeasors that have 
settled with a plaintiff.227 First, a nonsettlor may sue a settlor for 
220 See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5039, 5043 (1985); see 
also Neuman, supra note 219, at 1O,30l. 
221 See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975). 
222 See id. 
223 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
224 See id. at 401-02. 
225 See id. at 393, 394. 
226 See id. at 40l. 
227 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, caveat (1979». 
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contribution despite the settlor's prior release from liability.228 Sec-
ond, as under UCATA section 4,229 the nonsettlor may sue the settlor 
for contribution only if the settlement was not in good faith, while 
the plaintiff's claim against the nonsettlor is reduced by the amount 
of the settlement. 230 Third, a court may take the approach contained 
in section 6 of the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA).231 
Under UCFA section 6, a court may reduce the amount of a 
plaintiff's claim against a nonsettlor by the proportionate share of 
the settling tortfeasor.232 As a result, a plaintiff would be able to 
seek from a nonsettlor only an amount equal to the nonsettlor's 
proportionate share of liability, and the nonsettlor would not need 
to bring a contribution action to recover the amount it paid over its 
equitable share.233 The Conservation Chemical court decided to 
adopt the U CF A approach. 234 
The court reasoned that the legislative history of CERCLA im-
poses an obligation on courts to apportion liability in CERCLA 
actions "in a fair and equitable manner. "235 It found that, of the three 
approaches considered, the approach embodied in the UCF A settle-
ment provision was the most consistent with this statutory objective 
and would fulfill congressional intent most effectively.236 Thus, al-
though the Conservation Chemical court ultimately approved the 
parties' proposed preliminary agreement,237 it concluded that courts 
thereafter should apportion liability among PRPs on the basis of 
comparative fault and determine the effect of settlements on non-
settling PRPs according to the principles of UCF A rather than 
228 See id. 
229 See supra note 217. 
230 See Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. at 401. 
231 See id.; see also UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6,12 U.L.A. 53 (1977). 
232 See Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. at 401. UCFA § 6, which is the counterpart 
to UCATA § 4, provides: 
A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and 
a person liable discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does 
not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. 
However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the 
amount of the released person's equitable share of the obligation .... 
12 U.L.A. 53 (Supp. 1990). 
233 See id. 
234 See Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. at 402. 
235 [d. at 401-02. The court stated that it would "not tolerate either a 'windfall' or a 
'wipeout' which results in an apportionment of responsibility which arbitrarily or unreasonably 
ignores the comparative fault of the parties, where there is a reasonable basis for allowing 
that comparison to be made. " [d. at 402. 
236 See id. 
237 [d. 
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UCATA.238 Although the court's embrace of the UCF A approach 
was dicta rather than holding, it did signal that not every court 
would accept the EPA's views of nonsettlor liability and contribution 
protection. 
B. Contribution Protection and Nonsettlor Liability Under SARA 
In 1986, Congress enacted section 9613(f)(2) to bar contribution 
actions against settling PRPS,239 and section 9613(f)(3) to authorize 
the government and settling PRPs to recover a portion of their costs 
from nonsettling PRPS.240 Congress intended these provisions of 
SARA to encourage the negotiated resolution, rather than the liti-
gation, of CERCLA enforcement actions.241 The rationale underlying 
section 9613(f)(2) appears to be that parties that cooperate with the 
government deserve reward for their cooperation, and that a release 
from liability is both an appropriate reward and an effective incentive 
to cooperation from the start.242 Conversely, section 9613(f)(2) im-
plicitly promises to impose a heavier financial burden on PRPs if 
they wait to settle.243 Section 9613(f)(3) provides settlors with fur-
ther reward for settling by permitting them to seek contribution 
from fellow PRPS.244 
1. The Statutory Language: Section 9613(f)(2) 
Section 9613(f)(2) provides that, in specific circumstances, parties 
settling with the government shall receive protection from actions 
238 See id. 
239 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988); cf. id. § 9622(g)(5) (contribution protection for de 
minimis settlors); id. § 9622(h)(4) (contribution protection for PRPs that settle cost recovery 
claims with government). 
240 See id. § 9613(0(3)(A)-(B). 
241 See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 80 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862. 
242 See id. One court explained that 
Congress' [sic] intent in enacting the contribution protection provision was to allow 
a settling party to avoid the specter of future litigation after settling with the various 
government bodies, by providing protection from later collateral attacks by other 
potentially liable parties who were not willing to come to the negotiating table early 
[sic] rather than later. The settling party is spared the uncertainty of later contri-
bution suits. 
Burlington Northern R.R. v. Time Oil Co., 738 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (W.D. Wash. 1990); see 
also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 (lst Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989 WL 140230, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 1989). 
243 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (1988); see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 
F. Supp. 1027, 1040 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). The court in United 
States v. Rohm & Haas stated bluntly that nonsettling PRPs "bear the risk that the settling 
defendants are paying less than their equitable share." 721 F. Supp. 666, 679 (D. N.J. 1989). 
244 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(3) (1988). 
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seeking contribution for certain costS. 245 Under section 9613(f)(2), a 
PRP that reaches a settlement with the government to undertake 
all or some of the response action at a site, or to pay all or some of 
the response costs, is not liable to any nonsettling PRP for contri-
bution regarding "the matters addressed in the settlement. "246 For 
the purposes of section 9613(f)(2), the following factors comprise the 
subject matter of a settlement: the hazardous substance or sub-
stances involved; the particular site in question; the period of time 
that the settlement covers; and the costs of the cleanup.247 To deter-
mine whether section 9613(f)(2) bars a subsequent claim against a 
settling PRP, a court must compare these factors in both the settle-
ment and the claim.248 Only if the settlement and the claim address 
the same subject matter can a court invoke section 9613(f)(2) and 
dismiss the claim. 249 
In addition, under section 9613(f)(2), a settlement agreement re-
leases only the settling PRP, unless it expressly absolves other 
parties from their obligation under CERCLA to pay their share of 
the response costS.250 In practice, a settlement agreement between 
the government and a PRP rarely releases the nonsettling PRPs, 
because non settling PRPs are often the target of subsequent EPA 
and private enforcement actions for contribution.251 While nonset-
tlors lose their right to contribution, settling PRPs keep that right 
and may sue the nonsettlors.252 Moreover, if a settlement does not 
provide for the complete cleanup of a site, or the full amount of 
cleanup costs, the government may bring an action against any 
245 Id. § 9613(0(2). Section 9613(0(2) reads: 
Id. 
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an admin-
istrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contri-
bution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not 
discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but 
it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement. 
246 See id.; see also United States v. Union Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1144, 1153 (E.D. Pa. 
1990); Burlington Northern R.R., 738 F. Supp. at 1342. 
247 Union Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. at 1154. 
248 Id. at 1153-55. 
249 See id. at 1153. According to the Union Gas court, to interpret § 9613(0(2) as providing 
total immunity from contribution actions to settling PRPs "would create a situation where 
persons settling with the United States who are later responsible for an unrelated act of 
improper disposal of hazardous waste would find themselves immune from liability under 
CERCLA or state laws-a result clearly not envisioned by CERCLA." Id. 
In addition, several courts have held that CERCLA does not bar actions for contribution 
under state law. See, e.g., Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626, 638 (D. N.J. 1990). 
260 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (1988). 
261 See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5035 (1985). 
262 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(3)(B) (1988). 
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non settlor. 253 Section 9613(f)(2) does require that the sum for which 
a nonsettlor is potentially liable be reduced by the specific amount 
of the settlement,254 but it does not offer these so-called 
"recalcitrants"255 any other protection.256 
2. Current Approaches to Determining Nonsettlor Liability Under 
CERCLA 
The courts that have addressed nonsettling PRPs' objections to 
partial settlements of CERCLA actions have taken two different 
approaches. Courts following what has become the majority ap-
proach basically have adopted the tenets of the EPA's 1985 Hazard-
ous Waste Enforcement Policy.257 These courts interpret section 
9613(f)(2) as a modified version of UCATA section 4 and reduce 
nonsettlors' liability by the amount of the settlement, no matter 
what that amount is.258 
The few courts adopting the minority approach to determining the 
effect of settlement on nonsettlor liability instead have paid heed to 
the dicta in Conservation Chemical that exhorted the application of 
UCF A principles to CERCLA settlements.259 These courts have 
reduced nonsettlors' liability by the settlors' proportionate share of 
the liability, rather than by the amount of any settlement. 26o In such 
cases, settlors have not needed to ask for protection from nonset-
tlors' actions for contribution, because the nonsettlors have not had 
253 See id. § 9613(f)(3)(A). 
254 See id. § 9613(f)(2). 
255 See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5035 (1985). 
256 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988); see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 
F. Supp. 1027, 1037-'18 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). 
257 See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text. 
256 See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 91 (1st Cir. 1990); Allied 
Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626, 638-'19 (D. N.J. 1990); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford 
Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (D. Mass. 1989); United States v. Pepper's Steel and Alloys, 
Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1160, 1168 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (UCATA § 4 governs covenant not to sue 
between government and settling PRPs regarding site cleanup); cf United States v. Kramer, 
757 F. Supp. 397, 422-23 (D. N.J. 1991) (court struck defenses asserting that liability should 
be proportionate to responsibility, not joint and several). 
259 See supra notes 223-'18 and accompanying text. 
260 United States v. Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989 WL 140230, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 
1989); Lyncott Corp. v Chemical Waste Management, 690 F. Supp. 1409, 1417-18 (E.D. Pa. 
1988); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., No. 85 C 1142, 1987 WL 27368, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1987). 
One court held that it did not need to decide whether UCATA or UCF A principles should 
govern the effect of a consent decree on nonsettling PRPs, because the issue would not be 
"ripe for resolution" until the government sued those parties. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 
717 F. Supp. 507, 519 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
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to pay more than their equitable share and thus have not needed to 
seek contribution. 
Many nonsettling PRPs have objected to the majority-rule inter-
pretation of section 9613(f)(2).261 They have argued that settlements 
reflecting this interpretation are unfair, detrimental to them, and 
inconsistent with the goals of CERCLA. 262 In their view, courts that 
take the majority view of section 9613(f)(2) approve settlements that 
inevitably disadvantage nonsettlors in one of two ways.263 These 
settlements either render nonsettlors liable for contribution to set-
tlors that have paid more than their proportionate share of the 
liability at a site, or force nonsettlors to "absorb the shortfall" when 
the settlors have paid less than their proportionate share. 264 In other 
words, regardless of the size of each settlors' payment to the gov-
ernment, a non settlor always is left open to actions to compel it to 
pay more than its proportionate share in order to resolve its liabil-
ity.265 The majority approach nonetheless remains the majority ap-
proach, and most courts have rejected the objections of nonsettling 
PRPs. 
a. The Majority Approach: UGATA as the Model 
United States v. Rohm & Haas GO.266 most clearly articulates the 
majority approach to the intersecting issues of nonsettlor liability 
and contribution protection under CERCLA. In brief, the case sup-
ports a strict interpretation of the language of section 9613(f)(2)267 
and concludes that Congress purposefully incorporated UCATA sec-
tion 4268 into CERCLA to leave nonsettling PRPs with the risk of 
bearing a disproportionate share of liability. 269 
In Rohm & Haas, the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey reviewed a proposed partial consent decree that 
261 See, e.g., Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d at 83; United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 
721 F. Supp. 666, 670 (D.N.J. 1989). 
262 See, e.g., Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d at 92; Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 
670. 
263 See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 681 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
264 See id. 
265 See id. 
266 721 F. Supp. 666 (D. N.J. 1989). 
267 See id. at 675-76. 
268 See supra note 217. 
269 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 677; see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g 
Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Disproportionate liability, a technique which promotes 
early settlements and deters litigation for litigation's sake, is an integral part of the statutory 
plan."). 
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would have required twelve de minimis settlors to pay the United 
States and New Jersey about $3 million toward the cleanup of a 
landfill site in New Jersey. 270 The estimated costs of the cleanup 
then totalled about $65.3 million.271 Several nonsettlors opposed en-
try of the decree, Rohm & Haas objecting on the grounds that the 
settlement did not reflect the settlors' equitable share of the respon-
sibility for the site. 272 The court nonetheless decided to enter the 
decree. 273 
The court determined that section 9613(f)(2) and section 
9622(g)(5),274 which governs the effect of de minimis settlements on 
nonsettling PRPs' contribution rights, each extinguished any right 
to contribution that Rohm & Haas could claim. 275 In addition, the 
court held that, in lieu of allowing contribution, these sections less-
ened all the nonsettling PRPs' liability by the amount that the de 
minimis settlors had paid the plaintiffs. 276 It cited the fact that, 
before the enactment of SARA, the EPA had advocated determining 
the effect of partial settlements on nonsettlors in CERCLA cases 
by looking to UCATA section 4.277 
The Rohm & Haas court held that it neither needed nor had the 
authority to choose between crediting the nonsettlors with the pro-
portionate share of liability attributable to the settlors, and crediting 
them only the amount of the settlement.278 According to the court, 
in enacting sections 9613(f)(2) and 9622(g)(5), Congress mandated 
that courts bar nonsettlors' claims for contribution and credit non-
settlors "with the amount of the settlement and nothing more. "279 In 
270 Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 672. 
271 Id. at 671. 
272 Id. at 670; United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869, 871 (D. N.J. 1990); United 
States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1047 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 
(lst Cir. 1990). 
273 Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 701. 
274 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) (1988). 
275 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 675-76. 
276 See id. 
277 See id. at 676-77; see also In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 
1019 n.9 (D. Mass. 1989). 
278 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 677. 
279 Id.; see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 1990). The 
court in Cannons Engineering Corp. stated that 
the law's plain language admits of no construction other than a dollar-for-dollar 
reduction of the aggregate liability .... This clear and unequivocal mandate overrides 
appellants' quixotic imprecation that their liability should be reduced not by the 
amount of the settlement but by the equitable shares of the settling parties. 
899 F.2d at 92. 
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this way, Congress created an effective and fair scheme that en-
couraged PRPs to settle by punishing nonsettlors. 280 
After reaching this conclusion, the court in Rohm & Haas dis-
cussed the reasons that the use of what it called a "UCFA propor-
tional judgment reduction mechanism" would be inappropriate. 281 
First, sections 9613(f)(2) and 9622(g)(5) appear to be based on 
UCATA section 4, not UCFA section 6. 282 According to the court, if 
Congress had intended courts to use a comparative fault approach 
in determining the amount of a nonsettlor's liability, it would have 
chosen language that more closely resembles U CF A section 6.283 The 
court implied that, instead, Congress imported much of UCATA 
section 4 into CERCLA word for word. 284 
Second, according to the Rohm & Haas court, the U CF A approach 
is inconsistent with SARA's goals of minimizing litigation and pro-
moting voluntary settlements.285 The court reasoned that application 
of the UCFA approach likely would deter the government from 
entering into partial settlements, because the approach would force 
the government, rather than settling PRPs, to litigate with nonset-
tlors the issue of whether the settlors paid their proportionate share 
of the response costs at a site.286 Instead of settling and later recov-
ering the remainder of the response costs at the site from the non-
settlors, as a court applying UCATA would allow, the government 
would have to engage in a potentially lengthy, complex, and expen-
sive battle with the nonsettlors over whether the initial settlement 
adequately reflected the settlors' fair share of responsibility for the 
site.287 Thus, according to the court, using the UCF A approach would 
undercut one of the primary benefits that the government seeks in 
settling CERCLA enforcement actions: reducing the amounts of 
time, personnel, and money that it must spend on litigation. 288 
280 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 676; see also Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 
626,638-39 (D. N.J. 1990); Central Ill. Public Serv. Co. v. Industrial Oil Tank & Line Cleaning 
Serv., 730 F. Supp. 1498, 1504 (W.D. Mo. 1990); In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 1027. 
281 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 678. 
282 Id.; see also supra notes 217 and 232. 
283 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 678; see also Frola, 730 F. Supp. at 638 (language 
of § 9613(f)(2) "completely incompatible with any theory of comparative negligence"). 
284 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 676-78; see also United States v. Cannons Eng'g 
Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1044 n.24 (D. Mass. 1989) (SARA "expressly rejected" UCFA 
approach in favor of UCATA approach), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). 
285 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 678 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1988». 
286 See id.; see also In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 
n.14 (D. Mass. 1989). 
287 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 678,679 n.14. 
288 See id. at 678. 
-- -------
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In addition, under the UCFA approach, if the government ob-
tained less than the settling PRPs' proportionate share of the re-
sponse costs at a site, the government would have to pay for any 
difference between the amount of that proportionate share and the 
actual amount of the settlement.289 A court applying UCF A princi-
ples would allow the nonsettlors to pay only their equitable share, 
leaving the government to absorb the costs that it could not recover 
from any of the PRPs. Under this scenario, the Rohm & Haas court 
concluded, the government always would do better to forgo any 
attempt at settlement and instead sue any or all of the PRPs for all 
of the cleanup costs at a site. 290 Finding that Congress did not intend 
this result, the court rejected the idea that it should apply the UCF A 
approach to settlements in which the government gives contribution 
protection to settling PRPS.291 
Other courts have adopted the majority, UCATA approach in 
resolving the issue of what effect a CERCLA settlement has on 
nonsettling PRPs. In United States v. Cannons Engineering 
COrp.,292 for example, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts concluded that using UCF A principles to 
review CERCLA settlements is inappropriate, because it runs 
counter to the purpose of UCFA.293 In Cannons Engineering, the 
United States, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire had sought the 
court's approval of two partial consent decrees in which fifty-nine 
PRPs had agreed to pay a total of almost $20 million for cleanup 
activities at four sites in the two states. 294 The court accepted the 
governments' contention that the primary purpose of UCF A, as 
stated by the Act's authors, was to provide a model statute for states 
that wanted to replace the traditional defense of contributory neg-
ligence with a comparative fault method of dividing liability among 
parties.295 According to the court, because CERCLA liability is 
based on strict liability rather than on negligence or comparative 
289 See id.; cf. In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 1032 (court rejects nonsettlor argument 
that government should bear loss for shortfall caused by discounted settlement). 
290 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 679. 
291 See id.; cf. In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 1032 ("The problem with [the UCFAj 
approach is that it would effectively read out of subsection 113(0(2) the last phrase . . . . A 
court should not construe a statute so as to render any of it a nullity .... ") (citations omitted). 
292 720 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Mass. 1989), a/I'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). 
293 See id. at 1049 n.29. 
294 See id. at 1030-31. 
295 See id. at 1049 n.29. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
explained in the Act's Prefatory Note that it promulgated UCFA not to supplant UCATA, 
but to provide an alternative to UCATA. Id. UCATA itself would remain for use by states 
that chose not to adopt comparative fault principles. Id. 
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fault, the UCF A approach has no place in a court's determination of 
a PRP's liability to the government. 296 
The court in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Oil 
Tank & Line Cleaning Service297 also followed the UCATA approach. 
In Central Illinois, settling PRPs had agreed with the government 
to undertake cleanup measures at a site in Missouri where one of 
the PRPs had stored, treated, and disposed of polychlorinated bi-
phenyls, or PCBs.298 These settlors sought a declaratory judgment 
that certain nonsettling PRPs were liable for response costs at the 
site.299 The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri responded by offering three simple reasons why interpret-
ing section 9613(f)(2) as compelling nonsettlors to bear a dispropor-
tionate share of the liability at a site is both "permissible and fair. "300 
The court stated that, because liability under CERCLA is joint 
and several, the government may sue a PRP for up to the full amount 
of the cleanup costs at a site in the first instance.301 It implied that 
CERCLA places no greater burden on the nonsettlor by requiring 
it to pay more than its proportionate share in a subsequent action 
than it places on any PRP that is the target of the initial enforcement 
action.302 The major difference between settling PRPs and non set-
tling PRPs is that a settling PRP may relieve its burden by seeking 
contribution. 303 
In addition, according to the Central Illinois court, a nonsettlor 
typically has rejected a settlement offer from the government and 
thus deliberately chosen not to limit its payment to the proposed 
settlement amount. 304 Finally, in deciding not to settle, a nonsettlor 
has opted not to receive contribution protection from the govern-
ment.305 The court held that a non settlor, having taken these paths 
willingly, may not complain. 306 
296 See id. This conclusion, however, fails to recognize that UCFA § l(b) defines "fault" to 
include acts or omissions that subject a party to strict liability, as well as conduct that is 
negligent or reckless. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 41 (1977). 
297 730 F. Supp. 1498 (W.D. Mo. 1990). 
298 See id. at 150!. 
299 [d. 
300 [d. at 1505. 
301 See id. at 1505. 
302 See id.; see also Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626, 638 (D.N.J. 1990) ("Since the 
non-settlors remain jointly and severally liable, they must make good the balance regardless 
of whether the settlor pays less than its proportionate share of liability. "). 
303 See Central Ill. Public Servo CO. V. Industrial Oil Tank & Line Cleaning Serv., 730 F. 
Supp. 1498, 1505 (W.D. Mo. 1990). 
304 See id. 
305 See id. 
306 See id. 
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b. The Majority Approach: Courts' Criteria for Reviewing Partial 
Settlements 
The courts adopting the majority approach make an effort to 
guarantee that the "amount of the settlement"307 is not purely an 
arbitrary figure on which the government and the settling PRPs 
have based a "sweetheart deal."308 These courts have identified their 
task as ensuring that partial settlements are fair, adequate, reason-
able, and consistent with the Constitution and the purposes of CER-
CLA and SARA.309 They have recognized that, in reviewing the 
proposed consent decrees that embody these settlements, they must 
strike a balance between "rubber-stamping" a decree and so ex-
haustively examining it that they, in effect, try the case.310 Courts 
thus have applied varying but similar sets of factors in evaluating 
partial consent decrees in CERCLA cases. 
The factors that the Rohm & Haas court applied are typical of 
those used by the majority of courts. In Rohm & Haas, the court 
adopted a six-factor test to evaluate the reasonableness of a proposed 
partial consent decree between the government and twelve PRPS.311 
The six factors are the relative costs and benefits of litigating the 
case; the strength of the government's case against the settling 
PRPs; the degree to which the bargaining between the government 
and PRP negotiators was conducted in good faith, at arm's-length, 
and with candor and openness; the rational relationship of the set-
tlement amount to a plausible, if inaccurate, estimate of the settlors' 
volumetric contribution of wastes to the site; the ability of the set-
tlors to satisfy an even larger judgment; and, "finally and most 
importantly," the degree to which the settlement serves the public 
interest. 312 This last factor is intended to take into account a settle-
307 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (1988). 
308 See Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of 
Superfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261, 280, 283-87; Note, Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 69, 
at 1505. 
309 See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 756 F. Supp. 1215, 1218 (E.D. Ark. 1991); United States v. 
Bliss, 133 F.R.D. 559, 568 (E.D. Mo. 1990); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 
666,680 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 
1337 (S.D. Ind. 1982) and United States v. Hooker Chern. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 
1067,1072 (W.D.N.Y. 1982». 
310 See, e.g., United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869, 871-72 (D. N.J. 1990); Rohm 
& Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 680. 
311 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 687. 
312 Id. at 687; cf. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1028 
(D. Mass. 1989) (proposing settlement criteria); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 717 F. Supp. 
507, 516-19 (W.D. Mich 1989) (proposing settlement criteria). 
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ment's effectiveness in compelling the cleanup of the site in question 
and compensating the public for its past cleanup costS. 313 
In addition, according to the Rohm & Haas court, a presumption 
of validity attaches to a settlement that results from informed, ad-
versarial negotiations between a PRP and a government agency, 
such as the EPA, that has technical expertise and a statutory man-
date to enforce CERCLA.314 This presumption, combined with the 
general judicial policy of encouraging settlements,315 clearly "stacks 
the deck" against any nonsettling PRP that objects to a proposed 
CERCLA settlement. 316 
When a court finds that a partial settlement is reasonable in terms 
of these six factors, it does not need to undertake a separate eval-
uation of the settlement's fairness to non settling PRPs, according to 
the Rohm & Haas court.317 In addition, the court does not need 
either to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider nonsettlors' objec-
tions to the proposed settlement318 or to thoroughly review the paper 
record of a case, as Rohm & Haas requested. 319 A court must enter 
a proposed CERCLA consent decree despite its detrimental effect 
on a nonsettlor.320 Only in circumstances when the unfairness to a 
nonsettlor is so extreme that it rises to the level of a constitutional 
harm maya court reject a proposed decree.321 
Rejecting the objections of nonsettling defendants, the court in 
Rohm & Haas concluded that the partial settlement before it was 
313 See Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d at 89-90. 
314 See Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 681; see also United States v. Bliss, 133 F.R.D. 559, 
569 (E.D. Mo. 1990); In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 1028 (citing City of New York v. 
Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 692-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
315 See, e.g., Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d at 84; Thomas Solvent Co., 717 F. Supp. at 
516. 
316 See Neuman, supra note 219, at 10,298. 
317 See Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 687; see also Bliss, 133 F.R.D. at 568. 
318 See Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 686-87 (citing CERCLA cases in which courts 
refused to hold evidentiary hearing); see also Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d at 94; Bliss, 
133 F.R.D. at 568-69. For a short but helpful discussion of this issue, see Neuman, supra 
note 219, at 10,300. 
319 See Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 687. The court nonetheless extensively reviewed 
the facts of the case. See id. at 687-94. 
320 See id. at 687. As the court in In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor noted: 
An evaluation of the Proposed Decree which overemphasizes the importance of its 
potential effects on the nonsettlors ... would frustrate the statute's goal of promoting 
expeditious resolution of harmful environmental conditions. This Court, therefore, 
holds that in measuring whether the Proposed Decree is fair, reasonable, and pro-
tective of the public interest the effect on the nonsettlors is not determinative, but 
is merely one factor in the calculus. 
712 F. Supp. 1019, 1029 (D. Mass. 1989). 
321 See Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 687. 
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fair and reasonable. 322 It reasoned that CERCLA "is not a legislative 
scheme which places a high priority on fairness to generators of 
hazardous waste. "323 According to the court, its job was to guarantee 
only that the settlement was reasonable, not that the amount of the 
settlement accurately reflected the settling PRPs' probable contri-
bution of wastes to the site. 324 
c. The Minority Approach: UCFA as the Model 
United States v. Laskin325 is the only post-SARA case to apply 
the UCFA approach to section 9613(f)(2) as a means of determining 
the effect of a partial settlement on nonsettling PRPS.326 In Laskin, 
the EPA sought approval of a proposed consent decree in which 153 
PRPs had agreed to pay a total of $1.47 million to settle their liability 
at a hazardous waste disposal site in Ohio.327 Nine nonsettlors at the 
site brought a motion asking the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Ohio to defer entry of the decree until they 
had completed discovery on the issues of allocating liability and 
contribution, and the court had tried the issues. 328 The court then 
could decide whether each settlor was paying its proportionate share 
of the liability, according to the nonsettlors.329 In the alternative, 
the nonsettlors requested that the court modify the decree to pre-
serve all of their rights, including their right to contributiop..330 
The Laskin court declined to modify the proposed decree, reason-
ing that it would violate the plain language of section 9613(f)(2) if it 
provided the nonsettling PRPs with the right to sue the settlors for 
contribution. 331 The court also rebuffed the nonsettlors' request for 
322 See id. at 697. 
323 I d. at 686. 
324 See id. at 685-86; see also In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 1032. 
325 No. C84-2035Y, 1989 WL 140230 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 1989). 
326 See id. at *7. 
327 See id. at *1. 
328 See id. at *2. The nonsettlors emphasized that they had "valid and substantial defenses" 
against the claims of the government and the settlors. Id. at *2 n.5. 
329 See id. at *2. The nonsettlors in Laskin had two basic concerns. They wanted to ensure 
that they would not be liable to both the government and the settling defendants for the same 
share of the government's cleanup costs. See id. at *2. The nonsettlors also feared that the 
government would impose joint and several liability against them "for amounts underpaid by 
the settling defendants, and in excess of the nonsettling defendants [sic] share of liability." 
See id. 
330 See id. at *2. 
331 See id. at *4. The court approvingly cited Congress's reasons for enacting § 9613(f)(I) 
and § 9613(f)(2), "to encourage private party settlements and cleanups and to assure the 
finality of settlements." Id. at *3-*4. 
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an evidentiary hearing. 332 According to the court, neither CERCLA 
nor existing case law required it to hold a hearing, either to evaluate 
the fairness of the settlement to the nonsettlors or to examine how 
the settlement apportioned liability among the PRPS.333 The court 
added that it would perform an equitable division of liability later in 
the case. 334 
The Laskin court approved the proposed decree. 335 It also, how-
ever, expressed concern regarding the nonsettling PRPs' objections 
to the "possibility of potential liability in excess of their potential 
share of the damage. "336 As a result of this concern, the court decided 
to determine the effect that the settlement of the government's cost 
recovery action would have on the nonsettlors using the comparative 
fault approach.337 Noting that section 9613(f)(1) allowed it to select 
appropriate equitable factors for apportioning costs,338 the court 
flatly stated that it would use comparative fault principles in gen-
eral-and those laid out in UCF A section 6 in particular339-to make 
an equitable determination of the nonsettling PRPs' relative fault. 340 
The Laskin court thus rejected the majority rule that, in a cost 
recovery action, the government always may hold a PRP jointly and 
severally liable for all the cleanup costs at a site, regardless of the 
PRP's actual "fair share" of those costs. 
Under the Laskin court's approach, the government must reduce 
its claim against any nonsettlors in a CERCLA case by the greater 
of two amounts: either the amount of the settlement or the total 
amount of the settlors' proportionate shares of the liability.341 When 
the government accepts a settlement amount that is less than the 
settlors' combined proportionate share, it may not recover the dif-
ference from the nonsettlors.342 Thus, according to the court, the 
nonsettlors will not pay, through the imposition of joint and several 
332 See id. at *5. 
333 See id. 
334 See id. at *6. 
335 Id. 
336 See id. 
337 See id. at *7; see supra notes 165-81. The Laskin court stated that it would follow the 
reasoning of the court in United States v. Conservation Chem. Co. See supra notes 223-38 
and accompanying text. The Laskin court also looked to Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan 
Materials Co. for support for the UCFA approach. See No. 85 C 1142, 1987 WL 27368 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 4, 1987); see also supra notes 347-53 and accompanying text. 
338 Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989 WL 140320, at *6. 
339 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
340 See Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989 WL 140320, at *6. 
341 See id. at *7. 
342 Id. 
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liability, any costs properly attributable to the settlors.343 The Las-
kin court implied that other courts should follow this lead and use 
their equitable powers to reject any settlement that apportions lia-
bility in a manner that is grossly inequitable and detrimental to 
nonsettlors.344 
Other courts have turned to UCFA for guidance in apportioning 
liability and determining the effect of settlements on nonsettling 
PRPs.345 The settlements in these cases, however, involved contri-
bution actions between private parties rather than cost recovery 
actions that the government brought against a private party.346 In 
Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois approved 
a settlement between the plaintiff, Hines Lumber, and one of seven 
defendants, Vulcan. 347 Hines had sued the seven PRPs, all suppliers 
of wood-preserving chemicals, for contribution after the EPA or-
dered the company to clean up a defunct wood treatment facility 
that it once owned.348 The nonsettlors objected to a provision in the 
partial settlement that barred them from bringing cross-claims for 
contribution against Vulcan while preserving Hines's right to sue 
them.349 
Agreeing with the Conservation Chemical court that the UCFA 
approach was most consistent with the goals of CERCLA, the court 
in Hines Lumber applied what it called the "comparative fault rule" 
to the settlement.35o It held that the settlement provided plaintiff 
Hines and settling defendant Vulcan with protection from contribu-
tion actions by the nonsettlors, but offset the nonsettlors' share of 
343 See id. 
344 See id. 
345 See Comerica Bank-Detroit v. Allen Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 86-CV-40205FL, 1991 WL 
131941, at *7-*8 (E.D. Mich. July 19, 1991); Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Management, 
690 F. Supp. 1409, 1417-18 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulc-an Materials 
Co., No. 85 C 1142, 1987 WL 27368, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1987). 
346 See Lyncott Corp., 690 F. Supp. at 1410-11; Edward Hines Lumber Co., No. 85 C 1142, 
1987 WL 27368, at *1. Courts taking the majority, UCATA approach have noted this fact. 
See, e.g., Central Ill. Public Servo CO. V. Industrial Oil Tank & Line Cleaning Serv., 730 F. 
Supp. 1498, 1504 (W.D. Mo. 1990); United States V. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 677 
n.11 (D.N.J. 1989); United States V. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1049 (D. Mass. 
1989), a/I'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). 
347 Edward Hines Lumber Co., No. 85 C 1142, 1987 WL 27368, at *2. 
348 See Edward Hines Lumber CO. V. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 155 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
349 See Edward Hines Lumber Co., No. 85 C 1142, 1987 WL 27368, at *1. 
350 See id. at *2. According to the court, "this rule precludes a nonsettling defendant ... 
from asserting cross-claims for contribution against a settling defendant and allows the non-
settling defendant to offset its liability to the plaintiff by an amount proportionate to the 
settling defendant's responsibility." Id. 
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the overall cleanup costs at the site by Vulcan's proportionate share 
of those costS. 351 According to the court, using the comparative fault 
rule was equitable, because it simultaneously allowed Vulcan to "buy 
its peace" from Hines and protected the nonsettlors from having to 
pay more than their fair share of the liability.352 The Hines court 
also ruled that a hearing on the fairness of the settlement to the 
nonsettlors would force the parties to assume the costs and risks of 
the litigation that they had designed the settlement to avoid. 353 
In Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc.,354 the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania stated that using the UCF A approach in CERCLA cases is 
preferable to using the UCATA approach, because the UCFA ap-
proach is more equitable. 355 The court explicitly rejected the use of 
UCATA's settlement provisions as an inappropriate tool for review-
ing CERCLA settlements.356 It noted that UCATA would divide 
cleanup costs among PRPs on a pro rata basis,357 an apportionment 
method that previous courts had decided was inapplicable in CER-
CLA cases. 358 The court noted that UCF A, on the other hand, allows 
courts to apply comparative fault principles in actions, such as CER-
CLA actions, that are based on strict liability.359 It concluded that 
adopting the UCF A approach enables courts to avoid the inequity 
of forcing nonsettling PRPs to bear costs for which the settlors were 
responsible but did not pay. 360 
V. THE INTERSECTION OF SECTION 9613(f)(2) AND COMPARATIVE 
FAULT PRINCIPLES 
A. Laskin's Answer to the Majority Courts: A Fusion of Section 
9613(f )(2) and UCF A Section 6 
The majority of courts that have applied section 9613(f)(2)361 to 
CERCLA settlements between PRPs and the government have held 
that it requires courts to reduce the nonsettling PRPs' liability ac-
351 See id. 
352 I d. (nonsettlors' "liability will reflect only their responsibility for the cleanup costs, 
regardless of the amount the settling defendants tendered to the plaintiff."). 
353 See id. 
354 690 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
355 See Lyncott Corp., 690 F. Supp. at 1418. 
356 See id. 
357 See id.; see also supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. 
358 See Lyncott Corp., 690 F. Supp. at 1418. 
359 See id. 
360 See id. 
351 See supra notes 245-56 and accompanying text. 
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cording to the terms of UCATA section 4,362 by the amount of the 
settlement. 363 These courts have interpreted the statutory language 
"the amount of the settlement" to mean whatever figure at which 
the government and the settling PRPs arrive through arm's-length 
negotiation. 364 No court has rejected a proposed settlement on the 
grounds that the settlement amount is unacceptable because it rep-
resents less than the settlors' proportionate share of liability at the 
site. 365 
On the contrary, the majority-rule courts have recognized settlors' 
paying less than their "fair share" as their reward for settling with 
the government.366 These courts not only have acknowledged that 
recalcitrant nonsettlors subsequently may bear a disproportionate 
share of the liability, but actually have approved of this outcome, 
which they describe as a crucial part of the statutory scheme.367 
According to these courts, the majority interpretation of section 
9613(f)(2) fulfills CERCLA's goal of prompt PRP-funded cleanups 
by enabling the government to recover the balance of the response 
costs at a site from nonsettlors without having to litigate the relative 
fault of each PRP at the site.368 
Implicitly rejecting the opinions of these courts, the court in Las-
kin articulated a new interpretation of section 9613(f)(2). It stated 
that courts must use comparative fault principles to determine the 
liability of nonsettling PRPs to the government. 369 According to the 
court, it has the duty, as well as the authority, to ensure that 
nonsettlors will not be subject to inequitable settlements that force 
them to reimburse the government for sums exceeding the costs for 
which they were responsible. 370 
362 See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text. 
363 See supra notes 258, 279 and accompanying text. 
364 See supra note 258 and accompanying text. One commentator discussed several reasons 
why a plaintiff might accept less from a defendant in a settlement than the defendant's 
proportionate share of damages. These reasons include the plaintiff's providing a discount 
that accounts for the possibility that it could lose at trial, failing to "properly assess the merits 
of [its] case," and recognizing that the defendant cannot pay its full share. See DeWolf, supra 
note 186, at 55-58. 
365 See, e.g., United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 679 (D.N.J. 1989). The 
Rohm & Haas court noted, however, that it would not enter a consent decree if the harm 
that would result to a nonsettlor were so great that it would violate the Constitution. See id. 
at 679,687. 
366 See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
367 See supra notes 243, 269 and accompanying text. 
366 See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text. 
369 See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text. 
370 See supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
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In order to translate its proposal into action, the Laskin court 
incorporated the language of UCF A section 6371 into section 
9613(f)(2).372 More specifically, the court stated that it would reduce 
the claims of the government against the nonsettlors before it either 
by the amount of the settlement or by the combined total amount of 
all the settlors' equitable shares of liability, whichever amount was 
greater.373 It thus fused the language of section 9613(f)(2)-"the 
amount of the settlement"374-and the language of UCF A section 
6---"the amount of the [settlor's] equitable share of the obligation375-
to create a new standard for determining the amount by which courts 
must reduce a nonsettling PRP's liability after a CERCLA settle-
ment. This Comment will refer to the standard created by the Laskin 
court as the UCFA approach. 
The Laskin court did not explain in detail its understanding of 
how the application of the principles underlying UCF A to the ap-
portionment of nonsettlor liability would work in practice. It con-
cisely stated its intention to reduce the liability of nonsettling PRPs 
at CERCLA sites according to the alternative amount-based scheme 
that it had delineated, and tersely warned that it expected the 
government, not nonsettlors, to bear the risk that any settlor had 
paid less than its equitable share of liability.376 The court justified 
its decision only by quoting at length from the dicta in Conservation 
Chemical regarding the responsibility of courts in CERCLA cases 
to apportion liability fairly among PRPS,377 and by calling "special 
attention" to U CF A section 6.378 
371 See supra notes 231-'33 and accompanying text. 
372 See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
373 See supra note 341 and accompanying text. After announcing that it would use the 
comparative fault approach, the court did not address explicitly the issue of reducing the 
amount of the settlors' claims against the nonsettlors; it only discussed reducing the govern-
ment's claim. See Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989 WL 140230, at *7. The Laskin court, however, 
likely intended to apply the rule of UCFA § 4(a): that settling defendants may seek contribution 
for any amount that they have paid in excess of their equitable share of liability. See supra 
note 180. The court's comment that it would consider the issue of apportioning liability "in 
the context of the settling defendants [sic] suits for contribution against the non-settling 
defendants," in tandem with its proposal to apply UCFA, suggests that it held this view. See 
supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
374 42 U. s. C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988). 
375 See supra note 232. 
376 See supra note 342 and accompanying text. 
377 See supra note 339 and accompanying text. 
378 See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Benefits of Laskin's Comparative Fault Approach 
The Laskin court is brief but persuasive in its argument that using 
an approach based on the principles of UCF A to determine the 
liability of nonsettling PRPs to the government would be more ben-
eficial to the CERCLA settlement process than using the majority, 
UCATA approach. There would be two significant results if a court 
used the Laskin court's UCF A approach to apportion nonsettlor 
liability in CERCLA cases. First, UCF A section 6 would reduce the 
amount of the government's claim against any nonsettling PRPs by 
the combined amount of all the settling PRPs' equitable shares of 
the liability at the site,379 rather than just the amount of the settle-
ment between the government and the settling PRPs, as occurs 
under UCATA section 4. 380 
Second, under Laskin's UCF A approach, each nonsettling PRP 
would be liable to the government only for its proportionate share 
of the liability at a site.381 Holding a nonsettling PRP accountable 
only for its "fair share" is a radical departure from the government's 
version of the UCATA approach, which allows the government to 
sue each nonsettlor under a theory of joint and several liability for 
any and all cleanup costs that remain after settlement.382 There are 
a number of broad policy reasons, as well as reasons more specific 
to the implementation of CERCLA, for adopting a comparative fault 
approach to nonsettlor liability after CERCLA settlements. 
1. The Comparative Fault Approach Is More Equitable 
The primary reason for preferring the UCFA approach over the 
UCATA approach is simply that the UCATA approach leads to unfair 
results. 383 It separates liability from fault , 384 whereas the UCF A 
approach determines liability according to fault.385 CERCLA's goal 
of compelling PRPs to pay for the harm that they have caused at a 
site386 means just that-PRPs should pay for the harm for which 
they themselves are responsible at the site. It does not follow, 
however, that PRPs should have to pay for more than that for which 
379 See supra note 232. 
3BO See supra note 217. 
381 See supra notes 341-43. 
382 See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
383 See DeWolf, supra note 186, at 50--51. 
384 See id. 
386 See supra notes 166, 176 and accompanying text. 
386 See supra notes 6, 29 and accompanying text. 
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they are responsible. Because the UCATA approach forces nonset-
tlors to bear more than their burden, it strays from Congress's 
purposes in enacting CERCLA.387 Moreover, courts in other areas 
have applied comparative fault principles to determine the effect of 
settlements on nonsettlors, on the grounds that the comparative 
fault approach is the most fair.388 Generally, a growing number of 
courts are apportioning liability according to parties' relative culp-
ability. 389 
2. The Comparative Fault Approach Encourages Settlement 
The government typically argues that applying comparative fault 
principles in CERCLA cases would undercut the statute's aim of 
reaching quick settlements with PRPS.390 According to the govern-
ment, the multitude of factors that the parties must take into account 
in order to allocate liability according to relative fault would act as 
a severe disincentive to settlement. 391 In addition, the government 
argument continues, if the government were to agree to hold non-
settlors liable for their "fair share" of the costs at a site, then PRPs 
that might otherwise settle would hold out in order to receive the 
benefit of limited liability.392 This argument against the UCF A ap-
proach, though initially attractive, is flawed. 
The government appears to suggest that, whenever it successfully 
litigates against nonsettling PRPs for its uncollected cleanup costs, 
a court must award it the full amount of these costS. 393 However, 
CERCLA does not require explicitly that the government sue non-
settling PRPs to recover its cleanup costs at a site.394 Section 
9613(f)(3) states only that the government "may" bring such actions 
387 See supra notes 2-7, 29 and accompanying text. 
388 See, e.g., Miller v. Christopher, 887 F.2d 902, 903-07 (9th Cir. 1989) (admiralty case) 
(discussing cases that used comparative fault approach); Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 
1222, 1228-32 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Franklin v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 111 S. Ct. 
232 (1990) (securities fraud case); In re Sunrise Securities Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1258-61 
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (cited by United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 681 n.24 
(D. N.J. 1989)). 
389 See, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975) (admiralty 
case); Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (securities fraud case); McLean 
v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1272-76 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 
1190 (3d Cir. 1979) (securities fraud case). 
390 Neuman, supra note 219, at 10,302. 
391 See id. 
392 See id. 
393 See id. 
394 Id. 
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against nonsettlors.395 In addition, the statute does not require that 
the government always recover 100% of its unpaid costS. 396 For 
example, the fact that Congress provided for "mixed funding" in 
section 9622 indicates that it did not intend to require the govern-
ment to recover all of its costs from the PRPs at a site, whether 
settlors or nonsettlors.397 As one commentator has noted, it does not 
make sense to interpret CERCLA to allow the government to ex-
ercise tremendous equitable discretion while barring courts from 
exercising theirs.398 
Moreover, it is not as obvious as the government suggests that 
using the UCF A approach to determine nonsettlor liability would 
deter PRPs from settling.399 Settlements always will be attractive 
to parties that want to keep their litigation costs low and receive 
the contribution protection that section 9613(f)(2) provides to set-
tlors.400 It also is not clear that incorporating U CF A principles into 
the CERCLA settlement process would dampen the government's 
willingness to settle.401 Courts promoting the UCATA approach have 
held that the UCF A approach would deter the government from 
reaching settlements with PRPs, because the government-and not 
the settlors-would have to litigate with the nonsettlors the issue of 
whether the settlors paid their equitable share of the costs at a 
site. 402 As a result of this litigation, the government supposedly 
would lose at least the time and money that it intended to save by 
settling, and likely would spend much more than if it simply could 
sue the nonsettlors for the remainder of the cleanup costs at a site. 403 
This argument rests upon the apparent belief of the government 
and the majority-rule courts that the government and the nonsettlors 
must fight out the apportionment issue in court, and that only a 
court may make the decision about who is to pay the cleanup costs 
at a site. If, however, the task of allocating liability among PRPs 
falls not to the courts, but to the government itself, or the PRPs, 
or even a special master, then the rationale underlying the govern-
ment's argument virtually disappears. This Comment proposes to 
396 See id. at 10,302 n.88; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (1988). 
396 See Neuman, supra note 219, at 10,302. 
397 See id. at 10,302 n.88; see also supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
398 See Neuman, supra note 219, at 10,302. 
399 See id. 
400 Id. 
401 Id. 
402 See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text. 
403 Id. 
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assign the job of allocating liability to an entity other than the 
judiciary and thus to relieve all the parties of the burden of litigating 
the issues. 
In practical terms, the UCATA approach actually undercuts CER-
CLA's goal of promoting settlements, because it encourages partial 
settlements while discouraging "global" settlements.404 The approach 
allows the government to pursue non settling PRPs for the remainder 
of the cleanup costs at a site, and reduces the amount that the 
government may seek from a nonsettlor only by the amount it re-
ceived from the settling PRPs. The UCATA approach thus enables 
and even invites the government strategically to "split its bets," as 
one commentator has described it, by settling with one PRP for any 
amount it chooses, while continuing to seek the full amount of the 
remaining cleanup costs from the non settling PRPS.405 It encourages 
the government to use the settling PRPs to insure that the govern-
ment will recover a definite sum, while using the nonsettling PRPs 
to try to get a complete recovery. 406 
Applying the Laskin court's UCF A approach is more likely to 
promote global settlements in CERCLA cases, because the approach 
would require courts to determine the relative share of liability 
attributable to every party to an action before hearing claims for 
contribution. The resolution of all issues regarding the relative lia-
bility of each PRP would mean that few, if any, significant questions 
would remain for further trial. This lessening of the need for any 
additional litigation would make settlement both more possible and 
more attractive than under the UCATA approach. It would promote 
the increased settlement of contribution claims among PRPs, saving 
PRPs seeking contribution the time and money spent on litigation, 
and conserve judicial resources. It also would encourage the govern-
ment to settle with a nonsettling PRP rather than sue, because the 
government ultimately might recover only an amount of damages 
equal to the nonsettling PRP's equitable share of liability. 
404 See DeWolf, supra note 186, at 51. In a global settlement, all the parties to an action 
may resolve the whole action at one time. Id. 
405 See id. DeWolf gives several reasons why a partial settlement is better than no settle-
ment at all. A partial settlement may reduce the number or complexity of the issues that the 
parties must litigate at trial. It also may eliminate litigation costs that the settling parties 
otherwise would incur. Finally, it may lead to a total settlement. See id. at 47 n.30. Partial 
settlements also ensure that a plaintiff immediately will receive a definite sum of money, and 
allow the parties involved to remove themselves from the litigation and "pursue more pro-
ductive matters." M. Patricia Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multiparty Actions 
Under Rule lOb-5, 66 IOWA L. REV. 533, 543 (1981). 
406 See DeWolf, supra note 186, at 67. 
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In addition, under the UCATA approach, while the government 
would save the time and money it could have spent litigating against 
the PRPs with whom it opted to settle, it still would have to pay 
the costs of litigating against all the nonsettling PRPs. These costs 
easily could surpass the legal costs with which it began the case. As 
noted above, retaining these costs defeats one of the government's 
main purposes in settling CERCLA cases: avoiding such costS.407 
Finally, if the purpose of the UCATA rule is to enable a plaintiff to 
be made whole for its injury, the rationale underlying this purpose 
does not apply in CERCLA cases. 408 The government does not need 
to pursue nonsettlors for more than their equitable share of liability 
when it may use monies from the Superfund, under the "mixed 
funding" provision of section 9622,409 to pay for any costs that it 
could not recover from PRPS.410 
3. The Language of Section 9613(f)(2) Supports the Comparative 
Fault Approach 
The weakest argument of the majority courts and the government 
in support of the UCATA approach may be their claim that the 
language of section 9613(f)(2) clearly indicates Congress's intention 
to inculcate the terms of UCATA into CERCLA.411 The wording of 
section 9613(f)(2)412 is not identical to the language ofUCATA section 
4,413 and an examination of the legislative history of SARA suggests 
that there is room for much more flexibility in interpreting section 
9613(f)(2) than the majority of courts currently acknowledges. In 
fact, the language of section 9613(f)(2) arguably invites the appli-
cation of a UCF A-based approach, rather than the UCATA ap-
proach, which the EPA has promoted so fiercely. 
Before SARA's enactment in 1986, the government had advocated 
the adoption of UCATA section 4 as federal common law. 414 When 
407 See supra notes 285-88, 402-03 and accompanying text. 
408 Neuman, supra note 219, at 10,301. 
409 See supra notes 34, 41, 117-19 and accompanying text. 
410 Neuman, supra note 219, at 10,301-02. 
411 See Alfred R. Light, The Importance of "Being Taken": To Clarify and Confirm the 
Litigative Reconstruction of CERCLA's Text, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 25, 34-35 
(1990); Alfred R. Light, Sweetheart, Goodnight?, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 659, 660 (1989) 
[hereinafter Sweetheart, Goodnight?]; Alfred R. Light, SARA's Consequences: The Emerging 
Legal Debate over Liability, Contribution, and Administrative Law 57, 66-69, in HAZARDOUS 
WASTE LITIG. AFTER THE RCRA AND CERCLA AMENDMENTS 1987 (1987); Neuman, supra 
note 219, at 10,301. 
412 See supra note 245. 
413 See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
414 See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text; see also Sweetheart, Goodnight?, supra 
note 411, at 659. 
1991] CERCLA NONSETTLOR LIABILITY 125 
Congress began discussions to reauthorize CERCLA, the EPA pro-
posed legislation that embodied this pre-SARA embrace of the 
UCATA approach.415 The agency's suggested provision regarding 
contribution protection, proposed CERCLA section 113(k)(3), re-
duced the amount of any "claim" against a nonsettlor by an "amount 
stipulated by the settlement," as long as the settlement was "in good 
faith."416 This proposal obviously resembles UCATA section 4, which 
states that the release of a settling party reduces any "claim[s]" 
against nonsettling parties "to the extent of any amount stipulated 
by the release . . . or in the amount of the consideration paid for 
it. "417 
The first Senate committee to consider the EPA's proposed leg-
islation added their own language, which furthered the agency bill's 
ends by allowing the government to bring actions against nonsettlors 
"for the remainder of the relief sought. "418 The Senate committees 
that subsequently discussed the bill, however, made several signifi-
cant changes to its text.419 These changes, to which Congress ulti-
mately agreed, indicate that Congress did not want to incorporate 
the full-blown UCATA approach into the CERCLA settlement pro-
cess. 420 The changes suggest that proponents of the final version of 
the bill amending CERCLA not only saw value in a UCF A-based 
approach, but actually wanted to ensure that courts would apply 
equitable principles when they determined the liability of nonsettling 
PRPs. 
First, proposed section 113(k)(3), the EPA bill provision that ul-
timately became section 9613(f)(2), was altered so that it now re-
quires courts to reduce the amount of the nonsettlor's "potential 
liability," rather than the amount of the "claim" against the non set-
tlor, by "the amount of the settlement. "421 The second change in-
volved the elimination of the phrase "the remainder of the relief 
sought" from the EPA bill provision that eventually became section 
9613(f)(3).422 The combined effect of these amendments to the EPA 
bill was to foreclose the possibility that the size of a claim against a 
415 See Sweetheart, Goodnight?, supra note 411, at 659. 
416 s. 494, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1985). 
417 See supra note 217. 
418 See S. 51, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 126 (1985) (proposed CERCLA § 113(1)(4». 
419 See Sweetheart, Goodnight?, supra note 411, at 659-60; see also Neuman, supm note 
219, at 10,301 n.84. 
420 [d. at 660; see also Neuman, supra note 219, at 10,301. 
421 See Sweetheart, Goodnight?, supra note 411, at 660. 
422 See id. Section 9613(0(3) now states that the government "may bring an action against 
any person who has not ... resolved its liability" when it has "obtained less than complete 
relief" from that person. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(3) (1988). 
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nonsettlor could be determined solely by the terms of an earlier 
settlement.423 Despite the EPA's disagreement, the phrase "the 
amount of the settlement" does not place a ceiling on the amount by 
which a court may reduce a nonsettlor's "potential" liability. The 
plain language of section 9613(f)(2) requires courts to reduce a non-
settlor's liability by at least the amount of the settlement. It also 
permits courts to limit a nonsettlor's liability to less than the total 
amount of the government's uncollected cleanup costs at a site if a 
court decides that the nonsettlor's "fair share" of the costs at the 
site is less than the costs that the settlement assigned to the non-
settlor.424 In other words, Congress's use of the word "potential" 
implies that courts are allowed to hold nonsettlors liable for less than 
all the government's costs, if it is equitable for them to do so. 
C. Improvements on the Laskin Approach: A Modified UCFA 
Approach 
This Comment proposes three modifications to the UCFA ap-
proach, as the Laskin court delineated it, that would bring it more 
closely into line with CERCLA's goal of ensuring that responsible 
parties pay to remedy the harm that they caused. 425 First, rather 
than requiring courts to apportion liability among PRPs, the UCF A 
approach should assign that responsibility to the government, a PRP 
committee, or even a special master, whose sole task could be to 
research and resolve the highly technical issues that usually sur-
round PRP liability. Second, whatever entity performs the appor-
tionment of liability at a site should do so before the court approves 
a proposed settlement between the government and the settling 
PRPs at the site or otherwise determines the outcome of the gov-
ernment's cost recovery action against the PRPs there. Third, it 
may be more practical to apportion liability not just among the PRPs 
that the government sues in a cost recovery action, but also among 
those PRPs that the original defendant PRPs join as third-party 
defendants in contribution actions. 
428 See Sweetheart, Goodnight?, supra note 411, at 660. 
424 See id. But see United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 679 n.14 (1989) 
("[W]e are not persuaded that § [96]13(0(2) is merely some congressionally mandated minimum 
benefit to non-settlors, upon which courts may improve as they wish.") 
425 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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1. Who Should Perform the Apportionment? 
One argument against the adoption of the UCF A approach in 
CERCLA cases is that it would impose an overwhelming burden on 
the judiciary. This argument breaks down into two sub-arguments: 
first, that requiring courts to evaluate the relative fault of every 
PRP at a site and fashion a settlement accurately reflecting each 
PRP's proportionate share of liability is more costly and time-con-
suming than allowing them to follow the UCATA approach; and, 
second, that judges and juries do not have the technical expertise 
to apportion liability according to a comparative fault rule. 426 
Under a modified UCFA approach, the government could assume 
the job of apportioning liability among PRPs on the basis of com-
parative fault. The EPA usually has the most information about a 
site, at least in the early stages of a case, and its estimates could 
give PRPs an idea of what the government considers an appropriate 
apportionment of liability at the site. 427 The EPA, however, generally 
has declined most opportunities to become involved formally in 
PRPs' negotiations to allocate liability.428 Stating that PRPs should 
"work out among themselves questions of how much each will pay 
towards settlement at a site,"429 the EPA typically has provided only 
the information contained in the "special notice" letters that it sends 
to PRPs to notify them of their potential liability at a site, identify 
their fellow PRPs, and encourage them to negotiate. 430 
Nonetheless, the government's pre-complaint-filing policy of 
trying to identify PRPs' contributions to the harm at a site encour-
ages it to take an active role in PRPs' discussions on allocating 
liability at the site. 431 Moreover, CERCLA provides the government 
with the authority to collect and use information about the contam-
ination at a site432 to begin to apportion liability among PRPs at an 
426 Even with such expertise, a court would need to review an enormous amount of 
documentation and conduct impractical evidentiary hearings. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River 
& New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1031 n.21 (D. Mass. 1989); see also supra notes 
317-19 and accompanying text. This not only would threaten to exhaust the resources of the 
court system and the parties, but also would delay both the start of the cleanup, which is the 
subject and purpose of the litigation, and the replenishment of the Superfund. 
427 See Balcke, supra note 116, at 153. 
428 See, e.g., id.; Peter F. Sexton, Note, Superfund Settlements: The EPA's Role, 20 CONN. 
L. REV. 923, 946 (1988). 
429 Sexton, supra note 428, at 946 (citing Interim Guidelines for Preparing Nonbinding 
Allocations of Responsibility, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,919, 19,919 (1987)). 
430 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(1) (1988); see also supra note 107. 
431 See Gaynor, supra note 88, at 757. 
432 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1988) (granting EPA power to undertake investigations, 
128 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:73 
early stage.433 Most significantly, section 9622(e)(3) enables the EPA 
to prepare a preliminary NBAR434 in which the agency assigns PRPs 
roughly proportional percentages of the total liability at a site, after 
performing a remedial investigation and feasibility study (RIIFS) 
there. 435 When the EPA performs an RIIFS, it collects enough fac-
tual information about the conditions at a site to select an effective 
remedy for the site. Section 9622(e)(3) assumes that this information 
may be a sufficient basis for allocating liability among the PRPs at 
the site, and encourages the EPA to perform such an allocation in 
order to promote a settlement. 436 Section 9622(e)(3) provides that 
the PRPs at the site fund the NBAR.437 
Section 9622(e)(3) limits the use of NBARs, however, to sites 
where the government believes that an NBAR might encourage 
settlement. 438 Moreover, the government may reject PRP settlement 
offers that are based on NBARs, even if an offer represents a 
substantial portion of the cleanup costs at a site.439 The fact that the 
government has tremendous discretion in electing to prepare an 
NBAR, let alone in approving a settlement offer that is based upon 
one, renders the NBAR less than promising as an allocation tool. 
And, in practice, the EPA consistently has been reluctant to use 
NBARs.440 
Providing a more devastating blow to the NBAR's usefulness, 
however, is the fact that courts may neither receive an NBAR as 
evidence nor review the documentation supporting an NBAR.441 
Unless Congress amends section 9622(e)(3) both to allow courts to 
examine NBARs as they would other evidence and to give courts 
the jurisdiction to review NBARs as part of the administrative 
record regarding a site cleanup, the NBAR will remain a potentially 
conduct monitoring, surveys, and testing, and otherwise gather information at site); id. 
§ 9604(e) (granting EPA access to information such as PRP business records and financial 
status, physical access to site, and authority to obtain samples from site); id. § 9622(e)(3)(B) 
(granting EPA subpoena authority to collect information for preparing NBAR). 
433 See, e.g., id. § 9622(e)(3) (allowing EPA to prepare NBARs); id. § 9622(g) (allowing 
EPA to settle with "de minimis" parties). 
434 See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text. 
435 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(A) (1988); cf. Interim Guidelines for Preparing Nonbinding Al-
locations of Responsibility, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,919, 19,920 (1987) (EPA must issue NBAR "as 
soon as practicable, but not later than" completion of RIIFS). 
436 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(A) (1988). 
437 Id. § 9622(e)(3)(D). 
438 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
439 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
440 See supra note 428 and accompanying text. 
441 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(C) (1988). 
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effective but crippled method of starting to resolve issues of liability 
earlier in a CERCLA case. 442 
Forming a PRP committee to apportion liability at a site would 
be another option under a modified UCF A approach.443 The PRPs 
forming the committee would determine its size and powers and the 
procedures by which it would operate, and then would elect or 
designate its members. They might want to set aside a certain 
number of seats for owners or operators, generators, and trans-
porters, or for larger and de minimis waste contributors. They 
probably would want to give the committee, at a minimum, the 
authority to gather information from each PRP, hire private inves-
tigators and technical experts as needed, and, most important, pro-
duce a document, binding on all committee members, that accurately 
divides liability among them according to relative fault. The com-
mittee also may want to hire its own attorney to conduct the exten-
sive discovery necessary to prepare an adequate allocation. 
The reliability of any numbers that parties to an action calculate 
by themselves is always questionable. 444 At a multi-PRP site, how-
ever, where the parties ultimately have divergent interests, it is 
reasonable to assume that each PRP would negotiate at arm's length 
and with zeal sufficient to protect its own interests. Such negotia-
tions more likely than not will arrive at inaccurate results. Alter-
natively, the government may assign one of its own technical experts 
to the committee, as an informal advisor to the committee,445 a full 
and formal participant in its discussions, or the primary decision-
maker. This government representative could observe or oversee 
the allocation process to prevent collusion or fraud, or to guard 
against inadvertent miscalculations. 
Another option would be to have a court appoint a "special mas-
ter."446 Under a modified UCFA approach, a master could have one 
442 For a discussion of the original Senate proposal regarding NBARs, see Prager, supra 
note 68, at 215-16; Balcke, supra note 116, at 146-47. The proposal would have required the 
EPA to prepare NBARs for "virtually all sites," and subjected to judicial review agency 
decisions not to accept settlement offers to pay more than 50% of the allocated costs. See 132 
CONGo REC. H9104 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986); see also Prager, supra note 68, at 216-17. 
443 See generally INFORMATION NETWORK FOR SUPERFUND SETTLEMENTS, PRP ORGA-
NIZATION HANDBOOK (1989). 
444 See DeWolf, supra note 186, at 62. 
446 See Sexton, supra note 428, at 946. 
446 FED. R. CIV. P. 53; see also Gaynor, supra note 88, at 758; see generally Lawrence 
Susskind, The Special Master as Environmental Mediator, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,239 (July ]987); Stuart P. Feldman, Note, Curbing The Recalcitrant Polluter: Post-
Decree Judicial Agents in Environmental Litigation, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 809 
(1991). One commentator, a federal judge, has suggested that courts appoint themselves aides 
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of two roles. It could collect, assimilate, and review as much infor-
mation as possible regarding the liability of a group of PRPs at a 
site and apportion liability among these parties using a comparative 
fault analysis. 447 The master then would provide the court with 
findings of fact regarding apportionment, and the court would use 
these findings in making its own legal findings, which it would 
announce when it entered judgment. In the alternative, the master 
could assist the court in reviewing a completed allocation that the 
parties have presented to the court for approval as part of a consent 
decree settling a case. Although parties to a suit usually split the 
cost of a master,448 it might be more fair to require the PRPs at a 
site to shoulder the full expem=!e, rather than require the taxpayers 
to pay a portion. 449 
Yet another possibility is alternative dispute resolution (ADR).450 
The presence of an independent third party-whether a mediator, 
an arbitrator, or a "judge" overseeing a mini-trial-may enable PRPs 
more easily to reach a consensus on how to allocate liability by 
introducing objectivity and credibility into the PRPs' negotiations. 451 
who would be "a kind of hybrid between a master and a scientific law clerk." Harold Leventhal, 
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PENN. L. REV. 509,550-
54 (1974). Once the government has filed its complaint, a court could assign such a "scientific 
law clerk" the task of either allocating liability among PRPs or assisting the court in reviewing 
the allocation when the parties present it to the court for approval. 
447 The government probably will object to having a master, rather than an "Article III 
judge," make what it would argue are legal decisions: the determinations of the PRPs' liability. 
See Gaynor, supra note 88, at 758. According to the government, the court should limit the 
tasks of the master to scheduling and discovery management. [d. It may be possible to avoid 
this issue by allowing a court to order the master to put its findings in factual terms rather 
than legal terms. In preparing its allocation, then, a master would make findings regarding 
the volume, toxicity, and migratory potential of each PRP's waste and the harm that the 
waste has caused relative to other PRPs' wastes, rather than findings regarding each PRP's 
share of liability. 
448 FED. R. CIV. P. 53. 
449 See Gaynor, supra note 88, at 758. 
<50 See generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance on the Use of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution in EPA Enforcement Cases, ELR ADMIN. MATERIALS 35,123 
(1988); see also Kenneth P. Cohen, Allocation of Superfund Cleanup Costs Among Potentially 
Responsible Parties: The Role of Binding Arbitration, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,158 (May 1988); Kit R. Krickenberger & Eugene Berman, Allocation of Superfund Site 
Costs Through Mediation by a Third Party Neutral, 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 453 (Sept. 1987); 
Richard H. Mays, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Environmental Enforcement: A Noble 
Experiment or a Lost Cause?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,087 (Mar. 1988). 
451 See Cohen, supra note 451, at 10,158. Cohen recognizes that ADR efforts often fail, 
because the disputes that arise over the selection of a remedy at a site "spill over" into 
negotiations regarding the allocation of cleanup costs among the PRPs at the site. [d. at 
10,159, 10,161. He proposes that, to prevent this "spillover" effect, PRPs agree initially to 
share all administrative and technical costs at a site on a per capita basis. [d. at 10,159. Once 
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As a result, the parties and the courts may avoid the time and 
expense of litigating these issues,452 and most important, disagree-
ments over how to allocate liability do not delay a more timely 
implementation of a site remedy. 453 
2. When Should the Apportionment Occur? 
Under a modified Laskin approach, the apportionment of liability 
among the PRPs at a CERCLA site could occur before court ap-
proval of any proposed settlement that would resolve the govern-
ment's cost recovery actions against some of the PRPs. The court 
then simultaneously would enter the judgment and announce the 
amount of damages for which each PRP that is a party to the action 
is responsible. Requiring courts to inform PRPs of the amount of 
their "fair share" of liability at a site at all-let alone before reso-
lution of the government's cost recovery action-would represent a 
vast improvement over the UCATA approach's explicit disregard 
for the equitable apportionment of liability. 454 
Some commentators have suggested that asking a court to make 
"subtle determination[s] of relative fault" before trial, in some type 
of summary proceeding, would be pointless. 455 Because a judge or 
jury usually wants to hear witnesses, view exhibits, and otherwise 
carefully examine the issues before rendering such a decision, these 
commentators assert, only a full trial on the merits will suffice.456 If, 
however, the government, a PRP committee, a special master, or 
an arbitrator allocates liability among the PRPs at a site, then the 
court would not have to assume the complex task of performing the 
allocation itself. Instead, it only would have to apply the same stan-
dard that courts use to review CERCLA consent decrees, and ex-
amine the completed allocation to ensure that it is fair, adequate, 
the site analysis and RIIFS are complete, and all the PRPs have been identified, the PRPs 
should separate their negotiations over the site remedy from their negotiations to allocate 
liability, by submitting to binding arbitration on the allocation issues. [d. at 10,159, 10,161-
63. When the site cleanup is complete, the PRPs may divide their expenses, pooled until that 
point, using the allocation scheme that results from the arbitration. 
462 [d. at 10,162. 
463 See id. 
.... UCATA § 2 expressly states that "in determining the ... shares of tortfeasors in the 
entire liability ... their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered .... " UNIF. 
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 87 (1975). 
455 See, e.g., DeWolf, supra note 186, at 62. 
456 See id. 
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reasonable, and consistent with the Constitution, CERCLA, and 
SARA. 457 
It is important to recognize that any apportionment of liability in 
a CERCLA case, whether based on relative fault or some other 
standard, may become inaccurate. Additional information may sur-
face about the conditions at a site or a PRP's responsibility at the 
site, and originally named PRPs may establish their "innocence." In 
addition, the apportionment may have allocated responsibility for 
less than the entire harm at a site, because the PRPs whose liability 
was determined only caused that amount of harm, and the EPA since 
may have discovered new PRPs at the site. These changes in the 
circumstances under which the apportionment occurred may in-
crease or reduce the amounts determined to represent each original 
PRP's equitable share of liability. 
Therefore, a modified UCF A approach would require a mechanism 
for redistributing the liability among PRPs at a site when an extreme 
change in circumstances at the site made it necessary. A court, or 
whatever other entity the PRPs at a site have chosen to prepare 
their original apportionment, could perform this redistribution in the 
same way that a court reallocates the share of an insolvent joint 
tortfeasor among other joint tortfeasors under UCF A section 2(d).458 
It may be simplest to require the entity that performs the original 
apportionment to review the status of a site every two years, or at 
some similarly appropriate interval, to ascertain whether it needs 
either to reapportion liability among the original PRPs or to deter-
mine any new PRPs' "fair shares" of liability. The change in circum-
stances at the site would have to be so great as to make it grossly 
inequitable not to respond by alleviating the original PRPs' new 
hardship. 
As a result, in order to ensure that they would be able to pay 
their share at a site and then be done with it, PRPs preparing the 
original apportionment would try to guarantee that the apportion-
ment was as comprehensive and accurate as possible. They also 
would try to ensure that as many other PRPs as they could join 
were parties to the action, in order to reduce their individual liability 
to the greatest extent possible. 
3. Whose Liability Should Be Subject to Apportionment? 
Under the UCFA approach as presently constituted in Laskin, 
only those PRPs that are defendants in the litigation at a site have 
457 See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
458 See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text. 
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their liability apportioned according to relative fault. 459 Under a 
modified UCF A approach, it may make sense to apportion liability 
among all of the PRPs joined as either defendants or third-party 
defendants, rather than only those PRPs that the government has 
chosen to join in the action. 
This approach could promote the statute's goal of placing the 
burdens of financing and performing site cleanups on the responsible 
parties. It also, however, poses serious questions concerning issues 
such as the binding nature of consent decrees, and the power of 
nonsettling parties to intervene before courts approve settlements 
that will deprive the nonsettlors of their claims. A discussion of 
these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. If the 
better policy is to force all of the PRPs at a site, and not just those 
made party to the litigation, to pay for the harm that they have 
caused, then the resolution of these issues is important. It would be 
more efficient, as well as more effective, to compel the defendant 
PRPs to join all of the other PRPs that they could locate to increase 
the size of the defendant pool. In addition, if as many PRPs were 
party to the litigation as possible, it would be more likely that the 
court's resolution of the case would be final. Because PRPs are 
seeking certainty about their status at a site when they negotiate a 
CERCLA settlement addressing their liability at a site, they would 
try to make the resolution of their liability as complete and as final 
as they could. The more parties they joined to the action, the 
stronger their assurance of finality would be. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When Congress amended CERCLA in 1986, it explicitly gave 
PRPs permission to sue one another for contribution. It also gave 
the government the authority to grant contribution protection-
protection against non settling PRPs' actions for contribution-to 
PRPs that reach an administrative or judicially approved settlement 
with the government. Courts have differed on how to determine the 
impact of settlements on nonsettling PRPs. Although the vast ma-
jority of courts have held that the statute's contribution protection 
provisions reduce a nonsettlor's liability only by the amount of the 
settlement to which the nonsettlor is not a party, the Laskin court 
broke from the pack to embrace equity. Turning its back on the 
majority of courts that addressed the issue, the Laskin court reduced 
459 See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
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the nonsettlors' potential liability at a site by the settlors' "fair share" 
of the cleanup costs at the site. 
Future application of the Laskin court's comparative fault ap-
proach in CERCLA cases, and rejection of the current "amount of 
the settlement" approach, would vastly improve the Superfund set-
tlement process, by forcing the parties on all sides of the table to 
take into account the principle of fairness. Adopting the Laskin 
court's comparative fault approach, with the three modifications that 
this Comment proposes, would fulfill CERCLA's goal of ensuring 
that responsible parties pay to remedy the harm that they caused. 
Moreover, allocating liability at CERCLA sites using this "fair 
share" method would promote CERCLA's goals of expediting clean-
ups, promoting voluntary settlements, and avoiding excessive liti-
gation. 
